



Federal Ministry
for Economic Cooperation
and Development

BMZ Evaluation Division: Evaluation Working Papers

Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan

Approaches and Methods



Preface by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

BMZ Evaluation Working Papers address a broad range of methodological and topical issues related to the evaluation of development cooperation. Some papers complement BMZ Evaluation Reports, others are free-standing. They are to stimulate discussion or serve as further reference to published reports. Like with BMZ Evaluation Reports the responsibility for the content of these papers remains fully with the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views held by BMZ.

The present paper on methods and approaches accompanies the evaluation report “Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Interim Report”¹. Like the main report this is an interim report. A final summary of the methodological challenges and solutions found – for further use and refinement - will be included in the comprehensive final evaluation report due in fall 2009.

The impact assessment and the present paper on methods are part of a three year joint research project conducted by the Evaluation Division of BMZ and the Free University of Berlin that seeks to measure the impact of development cooperation on governance, conflict resolution and security. A variety of methods is used to validate results. The larger aim is to contribute to our knowledge of building effective states after – and still imminent – violent conflict and to learn how development cooperation can contribute.

*BMZ Evaluation Division
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development*

¹ See “Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Interim Report” by Zürcher, Ch; Koehler, J.; and Böhnke, J (2007)., *Evaluation Report 028*, Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ).

This evaluation report is also accompanied by “Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Prestudy” by Zürcher, Ch.; Koehler, J. (2007), *Evaluation Working Papers*, Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

Preface by the Authors

This report is a step-by-step documentation of the methodological approach for an impact assessment of development cooperation in conflict zones. We designed this approach for one specific region – North East Afghanistan² – but we think that this approach can easily be adapted to other regions and other contexts.

This report is an output of a three year cooperative research project conducted by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), evaluation division, and Free University Berlin's research center 700.³ The basic question that we seek to address is whether development cooperation has an impact on conflict transformation and governance in the target zone. For this initial phase, however, our focus is predominantly on the various methodological challenges that such an endeavor presents.

This report can be read as a stand-alone document. However, readers may also want to consult two accompanying papers. First, we have tested our approach in a first round of research. Initial findings are documented in a separate report: Zürcher,C; Köhler,J; Böhnke,J.(2007): Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Interim Report. *Evaluation Reports 028*. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. Second, in planning this research, we prepared an inception report to this study which contains a conflict assessment of the target area, a brief analysis of German development projects portfolio in the region, and a first outline of the methods to be developed (Impact Assessment of Development Cooperation in Conflict Zones: Prestudy. Berlin and Bonn, September 2007).

We are grateful for valuable comments received during two rounds of presentation at the BMZ (Bonn, October 23, 2006, and February 2, 2007). Cornelius Graubner provided research assistance, and Jan Böhnke oversaw the statistical analysis.

Berlin, September 2007

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² North East Afghanistan consists of the four provinces Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and Badakhshan. These provinces cover together 85,600 square kilometres (13% of Afghanistan). We surveyed communities in the districts of Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Taloqan and Warsaj.

³ <http://www.bmz.de/en/evaluation/index.html>
<http://www.sfb-governance.de/>

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The Challenge

Measuring the cumulative impact of development aid in conflict zones (areas threatened by, in the midst of, or recovering from serious organized violence) is imperative, because the planning and implementing of effective strategies for strengthening stability in conflict zones must be based on valid impact assessments. The latter, however, is quite a daunting task for several reasons: First, there is a wide range of methodological problems. The first one can be formulated like this: How can we know what would have happened if there had not been an intervention? This tricky question lures behind any impact assessment. To give an example: To claim that a specific bundle of development projects have made life safer for the rural population of a district in Afghanistan means that we are reasonably sure that the same district, had it not received this bundle of development projects, would be less safe and less stable. Hence, we have to know what would have happened if.

There are different ways of reaching an answer to such a question: One is to link a specific development project to a specific outcome: by carefully tracing the processes - step by step - by which the stimuli created by a project lead to a certain outcome lends a certain plausibility to the argument that it was indeed the project that contributed to these changes. A second way is to compare the actual development (for example, of household incomes in villages that participate in a poverty relief program) with the expected "normal" future development. Such a comparison requires that we can estimate with some confidence how the future development would have been without the intervention. A third way is to compare how households that received aid have fared compared to households that did not. Provided that all households are similar at the onset of the program, one can attribute observable differences with some plausibility to the impact of aid. For this study, we used the first and the third approach, but adapted both to the context. This is described later in this report.

The second challenge stems from the nearly insatiable appetite for data that is typical for complex research questions. Imagine first that a researcher wants to assess the success of a housing program for returning refugees. He would probably be satisfied with data on the number of houses built, the number of inhabitants of these new apartments, and the overall number of refugees. By contrast imagine that the same researcher now wants to assess the cumulated impact of development cooperation on stability in a conflict zone. He invariably will need to collect data on different aspects of "stability" (for example: violent incidents, threat perceptions, refugees, organized crime...), but he will also need fine grain data on the many development projects which may have had an impact on the situation. Finally, he also needs data on those factors, other than development projects, that may have caused the observed changes. There is a fair chance that the researcher ends up with a long and completely unfeasible list of data he thinks he needs. Hence, what is needed is a strategy that allows minimizing the data needs to a feasible amount.

The third challenge stems very much from real life and can be summarized as "no roads, no names, no data". It is one peculiarity of conflict zones that they are often "logistically demanding". That is, it may take ages to travel from A to B, and one cannot be entirely sure to reach B in one piece. Another peculiarity is that reliable data is a scarce good in conflict zones. Statistical departments are a privilege of the few rich and stable countries. But obtaining data in conflict zones is often Don Quixote'esque: One needs to convince the myriad of International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to share their data which they are often reluctant

to do. The lack of transparency of many of these advocates of transparency and accountability is a stunning experience. But even if one gets from A to B and then back to A after a successful hunt for precious data, there is yet another obstacle: In a country like Afghanistan, there is great confusion when it comes to village names or exact administrative borders. Many villages have no names at all; others have more than one name. District borders are unknown or just being redrawn. As a result, localizing where a specific development project took place turns into a piece of investigative journalism. The only reliable information stems from GPS data, but recording project locations with GPS in a systematic way is not yet standard operational procedure in the development community. Hence, the research strategy should take into account the challenging conditions typical for conflict zones.


Donors are usually demanding and impatient. When they commission an impact assessment, they like it to be scientific and they would like to have it next month. But peace does not break out over night, impacts cannot be assessed by next week, and science is slow. Fortunately, in this project we were blessed with a partner who understands all these challenges and gave us all the support we needed. In what follows, we describe how we decided to cope with these challenges.

The Strategy

At its most basic, in order to conduct a valid impact assessment, researchers first need to define their overall **strategy** which sets the course for the rest of the research process. They need to set up a strategic framework that defines which social changes and processes at which level they think will make the conflict zone more stable. Such a framework hence defines what is relevant to observe, and what is not. It is against these relevance criteria that the impact of development cooperation can be assessed.

Second, taking into account the strategic framework, researchers then have to define the **general model** of how they think these relevant changes may occur. The general model specifies on which social changes the research will focus, and which factors may have caused these changes. At its most basic, such a general model is a set of plausible and testable assumptions about the causes of the changes that are observed.

Thirdly, researchers have to define what **data** is needed in order to pinpoint the changes they are interested in, and to trace the factors they think may have caused these changes.



Finally, researchers have to devise an **analytical strategy** that allows gauging the extent to which observed changes are attributable to development interventions (thereby separating the impact of development interventions from the impact of other causal factors such as, for example, natural endowment, demographical factors, migration, or hostile actions by external armed fractions).


Each of these four steps requires consequential decisions. In the following, we will briefly recapitulate how we have tackled the specific problems for this specific impact assessment, and why we did so.

The Strategic Framework

An impact assessment of the cumulative impact of development aid has to ex post derive the relevant criteria against which cumulated impact and success can be assessed. This is quite different from evaluating projects and programs: in this case, the relevant criteria (outputs and outcomes) are usually defined and documented in logframes or project planning matrixes. By contrast, an assessment of cumulative impact of development aid has to investigate whether the cumulated outcomes of many development programs have had an impact on the situation in the conflict zone in general. At the core of the issue then lies the question: What makes a conflict zone less vulnerable to relapsing into violence? Evidently, the possible range of answers to such a question is indefinite and ranges from idiosyncratic events (for example, the mood of a U.S. army commander) to long-term structural factors (for example, global warming). It is a key objective of the strategic framework to reduce the possible range of answers, that is, to reduce complexity.

In order to do so, researchers should carefully take into account (1) the development strategies that are manifested in the development portfolios in the target region, (2) predictions from conflict research, and (3) scenarios based on a conflict assessment in the target region. Metaphorically speaking, the research strategy should be placed within the intersection of the development portfolio (because that is what is being done), conflict theory (because it states what we should expect) and conflict assessment (because it lists the threats in the given context). The next graph depicts this intersection. For this study, we therefore took into account strategy and planning papers of Afghan and international development actors, we undertook a portfolio analysis of major actors for North East Afghanistan, and we began to map all ongoing development cooperation in the region. We based our key assumptions on recent

finding in conflict research⁴, and we produced a conflict assessment of the target region, based on secondary sources.



Based on the study of these documents, the researchers could further narrow down their strategic focus by asking the following questions:

- (1) What are the overall **strategic priorities** of the peacebuilding mission in the target region?
- (2) What are the plausible **threats** to these priorities?
- (3) What is the **time frame** in which development interventions should achieve the desired results?
- (4) What **level** of intervention seems most suitable for achieving the priority objectives?
- (5) Which **target groups** seem most suitable for achieving the priority objectives?

For this study, our answer to these questions can be summarized as follows:

We assumed that building up state-capacities was a key priority in the given context. We decided to focus on objective positive changes in the realm of security, material endowments, and good local governance in rural areas. We assumed that such positive changes can be interpreted as a sign of increased state capacity. We assumed that of crucial importance for the success of state building was for the new central state to win acceptance and loyalty of a largely skeptical rural population, and of the rural elite which by and large seems to adhere to a wait-and-see-who-wins-strategy.

We identified the development of a rentier state and the corruption by drug money as

⁴ For lack of space, we cannot give a full list of relevant works. A very good source is Collier, P., L. Elliot, et al. (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Report. Washington DC, World Bank and Oxford University Press.

the main threats to the emerging Afghan state. Because the stabilization of conflict zones requires quick progress we intended to measure changes within a timeframe of no more than three years.⁵

The General Model

A general model posits the major hypotheses of the investigation. It proposes the causal chains that bring along those changes which are, according to the strategic framework, helpful for stabilizing the conflict zone, and plausibly attributable to the ongoing development projects. It specifies which social changes the research will focus on, and which factors may have caused these changes. At its most basic, such a general model is a set of testable assumptions about the causes of the observed changes.

⁵ Here is a brief justification of these choices. For more details, please consult the inception report.

Strategic priorities: State capacities and security

Afghanistan will not become a stable, self-sustainable and peaceful state without building-up the administrative base for exercising state capacities. Both the strategies of the international community and the findings from conflict assessments on the central and local level converge on emphasizing the importance of building-up an administrative base for exercising state-capacities. Development projects should contribute to strengthening state-capacities. Increased state capacities should then be reflected at the regional and local level by visible improvements in security, welfare and good governance.

Threats

Frontloading of aid may create incentives for the Afghan state to turn into a rentier state. As a result, the state will grow weaker, not stronger, and Afghan ownership of the process is far from complete. Furthermore, the drug economy threatens to corrupt the statebuilding process. Drug money goes to regional power brokers and strengthens, in the long run, bad local governance. Lastly, the main threat to stability seems to be that the central state is unable to convince local power holders to align with it.

Time frame: Impact within three years

Conflict research shows that a post-conflict zone faces the highest danger of relapsing into war during the first three years after the cease-fire. Hence, in conflict zones, different from non-conflictive development environments, development projects should have a visible impact within three years after implementation. This requirement seems to be even more adequate in the light of recent negative tendencies in Afghanistan's security situation.

Level: Beyond Kabul, in rural areas

Statebuilding must outreach into the provinces. The findings from peace and conflict assessments on the regional level once more stress that the key problem of the Afghan statebuilding mission is the weakness of the central state vis-à-vis entrenched local powerbrokers. Yet, there is a high demand among the rural population for a state that delivers security, visible material improvement, increased good local governance and that helps strengthening conflict processing capacities at the regional level. Development projects should contribute to visible material improvement, good local governance, security and better conflict processing capacities on the regional and local level.

Target groups

Development projects should provide incentives and resources to regional powerbrokers and local populations in order to win their loyalty for the statebuilding process. Hence, development projects should have an impact within a short to medium timeframe, and they should focus on target groups from provincial populations and provincial elites.

We assumed that positive impacts of development cooperation will eventually be reflected in

- more security for communities,
- a better resource endowment,
- increased communal organizational capacities,
- a more positive perception of the state's capacity to deliver basic services,
- better institutions that facilitate dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way, and
- a broad acceptance of international organizations and development agencies on the ground.⁶

The model also defines the factors that have assumingly caused the observed changes in the dependent variables. It is presumed that the changes may be caused by three different sets of factors: Firstly, by the ongoing development projects, secondly, by preexisting local capacities that enable communities to better deal with the conflict situation, and thirdly, by a range of other exogenous factors.

⁶ Accordingly, we disaggregated the abstract notions of “conflict transformation” and “governance” into five components, taking into account the strategic framework. Below is a short justification of these choices.


Security: There is a broad agreement that security is paramount for the success of statebuilding. In order to assess the security situation we intend to measure the threat perception of the population and the number and quality of violent or disruptive incidences that affect the communities.

Conflict Processing: Whether conflicts turn into violence or not depends chiefly on the institutional framework that is in place. We therefore seek to measure the strength of institutions that deal with conflicts. Hence, we need to investigate what institutions exist and how efficient they are in dealing with those conflicts that threaten the communities.

Communal Organizational Capacities: It is assumed that communities which are able to organize themselves and to act collectively for a common good fare better with regard to development, but also with regard to coming to terms with conflicts. In order to assess the organizational capacities of a community, we need to investigate existing levels of trust and solidarity, networking capacities, and capacities for transparent and representative decision making.

Quality of the State's Services and Legitimacy: Successful statebuilding requires that the state provides a measure of basic goods, and that the population perceives the state as legitimate. We intend to measure the perception of respondents with regard to the state's provision of basic goods and infrastructure such as health and education, water, sanitation and electricity, agricultural services, and employment opportunities, but also with regard to the state's involvement in the provision of security and in conflict resolution.

Resource Endowment: It is one of the key objectives of development cooperation to increase the material welfare of individuals and communities. In addition, in a conflict zone, it is assumed that the costs for recruiting fighters will increase when young men have sources of income other than what they could earn as fighters. Hence, the resource endowment of communities is important both for development and for preventing armed conflict. We therefore investigate the levels of resource endowment of households and communities.



The Data

The basic model serves as a guideline for specifying what data is needed. Accordingly, in our case we needed to collect data on development cooperation, preexisting local capacities and other external factors which may have an impact on the changes that we observe. Furthermore, we had to collect data that lets us trace changes on our dependent variables: security for communities, a better resource endowment, increased communal organizational capacities, a more positive perception of the state's capacity to deliver basic services, better institutions or dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way, and a broad acceptance of international organizations and development agencies on the ground.

We applied five different methods of data collection:

Firstly, we conducted a baseline survey among households in the target region. We made sure that our sample was representative for the community (more on sampling below), which lets us establish profiles of 80 communities in four districts (we will conduct a follow-up survey in 2009 in order to trace changes).

Secondly, we asked experts to collect data in so called community profiles and district profiles. Here, we collected data that refers to the communities (or districts) as whole, for example, the number of schools or the access to markets. Data contained in these community profiles complement data from the surveys and allow crosschecking data by comparing the survey and the community profiles. The same logic applies to the community cluster and district profiles. The profile data is, compared to the data from the survey, more objective (expert based), whereas the survey data is more subjective (respondent based). Profile data refers to the whole community or district, whereas survey data is based on respondents' perception.

Thirdly, we commissioned semi-structured reports to be filled in by trained local correspondents four times a year. These so called quarterly reports record major events and significant changes, for examples major new development initiatives, outbreaks of violence, military operations and natural disasters. This sort of data cannot be captured in surveys or profiles. The quarterly reports may also be used to construct time series on a limited range of variables.

Fourthly, we will conduct in-depth qualitative case studies, mainly in regions which show untypical high or low values on the dependent variables, e.g. communities which seem to do untypically well or untypically bad. For these cases studies, we will rely on standard qualitative methods including expert interviews, focus groups interviews, participatory rural appraisal and ethnographic participatory observation.

Lastly, we mined existing data bases and imported, where feasible, data into our own databases. For example, we used a baseline survey from a development agency to create data on the material situation of the communities in our sample and we used an ISAF database to map security incidents in our target region.

The following sections describe these five data mining approaches in more detail.

The Surveys

The unit of analysis

We assumed that the impact of development cooperation should be observable at the communal level. Consequently, we designed a baseline questionnaire that allowed gathering relevant data on our variables for selected communities. The main unit of analysis was therefore the community.

We further assumed that, in the Afghan context, it was the household (rather than the individual) that forms the underlying structure of the village. Hence, we had to make sure to have a representative and random sample of households for each community. We surveyed 2,034 households in 77 communities. The size of the samples varied according to the size of the community in order to ensure that the sample was representative for the community as a whole. Such a sampling makes it possible to aggregate data on community level. In other words, statements like “village X is rich” or “people on village Y feel threatened” are based on representative samples of households.

Sampling

For this study, 77 communities were selected. The selection was based on the following criteria: half of the communities were selected by random sampling.⁷ The remaining 50 per cent were selected according to their diversity on six criteria: (1) size, (2) remoteness, (3) exposure to the main German rural development program (EON backbone area), (4) estimated natural resource base (access to irrigated or rain fed land, access to pastures, forest), (5) estimated vulnerability to natural disasters, and (6)

⁷ Random sampling needs to be qualified: no comprehensive list of communities within one district exists in Afghanistan. The most comprehensive one available is the AIMS GIS community table for Afghanistan (updated in June 2007, after the baseline survey). By conservative estimate, roughly 70 % of main communities are captured of which roughly 20% contain major flaws (wrong name or wrong location).

ethnic and religious composition. Since five of the six criteria⁸ had to rely on informed guessing and could be verified only during the initial fieldwork, some flexibility had to be exercised with regard to changing the pre-chosen target communities. Altogether, 20 communities had to be replaced in the course of the survey.

Implementation

The implementation of a survey in regions in which no population data is available on community level is challenging, because researchers cannot devise a sampling plan beforehand. Before conducting interviews in a community, the interview teams held an initial meeting with shura members, elders, and other local representatives. During that meeting, they established the number of households in the village. Once the teams had this information, they calculated the number of interviews that were needed in order to get a representative sample.

The two main limiting resources in doing survey research are the budget available to the researchers and the time that it will take respondents to answer. Interviews should therefore be limited to a maximum of ninety minutes; otherwise they are not feasible any more. In our study, the average interview lasted about sixty-four minutes, with a minimum of forty and a maximum of 105 minutes.

Before implementing the survey, we made sure that the questionnaire was peer-reviewed by country experts. Furthermore, we carefully followed the process of translating the questions into Dari making sure that the translation “meant” what we had in mind. Specific phrases had to be adapted to local usages and local meanings. The enumerators then received intensive training. A one-week training and preparation workshop was held in Kabul from the February 21 to February 28, 2007. Finally, we ran a pre-test with 35 respondents.

The content

The survey was designed to generate data on objective indicators of development cooperation and local capacities. Furthermore, we also asked about subjective perceptions of respondents on topics such as the coverage and usefulness of development cooperation projects within the community, or the perception of everyday security. A major challenge of survey design is to make the concepts one is interested in measurable (“operationalization”). Each concept has to be transformed into questions which cover relevant aspects. Often, it is necessary to divide broad and quite abstract concepts into various sub-concepts. For example, in order to assess levels of security, one might divide the concept “security” into “physical security”, “land tenure security”, and “threat perceptions”. A detailed overview of the main concepts that we sought to cover is given below. The full questionnaire can be found in the appendix.

Resource endowment

This section seeks to establish a measure for the households overall resource endowment. Resources can stem from different sources, such as access to land, live stock or off-farm income; hence, the questions pertained to different sources of income. We also included questions about the perception of the household’s resource endowment. A measure for the resource endowments of households is needed, because (1) we want to monitor changes over time, and (2) we need to control for income when analyzing other factors.

⁸ Even the identification of communities within the EON backbone area proved to be difficult since no comprehensive lists of villages within these areas exist; their exact whereabouts are only known to the local engineers and the names used locally can vary and do not coincide with the names on maps.

Security

This section asks about the perception with regard to security, asks which foreign and domestic actors are credited for bringing along positive changes, and which groups are seen as a threat. We also asked about concrete security incidences that were experienced by the interlocutors and their household members. Finally, we asked whether the respondent had heard about the PRT in Kunduz, and how he assessed the PRT's impact.

Conflict processing

This section asks about the number of violent conflicts that have happened within the community; we then proceeded to ask questions about which actors are seen as most capable in regulating arising conflicts in a non-violent, just, and procedural way. Finally, we asked whether respondents think they can turn to the state authority in case they think their claims have been unjustly ignored.

Community/Shura

This section seeks to investigate power structures within the community. The focus is on whether respondents think that their community is governed by a few powerful individuals, or rather by a collective body which enjoys legitimacy. The shura is the collective body that traditionally takes important decisions within a community. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) has further promoted the emergence of so called CDC (Community Development Councils) to become a major body for community driven development. Often, traditional shuras and the new CDC converge. In this section, we asked whether respondents think that their shuras are representative, accessible and legitimate, and what role they play with regard to choosing development projects.

Local organizational capacities, social capital, and communal norms

Community driven development – which is the prevailing strategy in Afghanistan's rural areas – seeks to increase a community's capacity for collective action. In this section, we asked about prevailing norms and practices of solidarity and mutual support which facilitates collective action.

Networking and mobility

This section investigates where and how often community members actually meet and interact inside and outside their communities. Interaction is seen as a proxy for possible networking which in turn is seen as fundamental for the emergence of a civil society.

State services and legitimacy

This section asks about respondents' perception of the state's capacity to deliver services. We focused on basic sectors such as drinking water, roads, electricity, jobs, and schooling (note that security was covered in other sections). We also asked about other actors' capacity to deliver services in these sectors. Other questions pertained to tax paying, perception of the police forces, or credit opportunities for households. Finally, we asked about respondents' perceptions of whether state officials at the district and provincial level take care of the population's needs.

Norms and values

This section asks about respondents' positions on disputed questions. Answers to these questions may reveal more or less skepticism towards the values that accompany the international community's efforts at rebuilding Afghanistan. Specifically, we asked views with regard to schooling for boys and girls, wage labor opportunities for women, and whether the presence of development agencies and foreign troops poses a threat to local values and customs.

NGO/IO perception

This section asks whether respondents think that their households and their communities have been a beneficiary of development projects or not. Again, we focused on such basic sectors as drinking water, irrigation, roads, electricity, jobs, and schooling.

Information on respondents

In the last section, we collected information on the level of education, ethnic and religious belongings, and size of households.

Profiles

A separate team was trained for collecting relevant data for village and district profiles. The data collection of the profiles can best be understood as a combination of expert interviews and focus group interviews. A trained team of enumerators compiled data according to standardized questions, based on their expert knowledge and on lengthy interviews with community authorities, community councils, or community elders. These profiles contain information on the history, demography, ethnic composition, political and social organization, resource endowment, and levels of received aid of communities. It should be noted that in other settings much of this data would be readily available from statistics and censuses. In the Afghan context, however, we had to collect this data on our own.

The community profile consists of 54 questions and a coversheet.⁹

First, the name of the community was established. As unlikely as this may sound, this proved to be a challenge. Often, there are no official village names and no formal system of community self-administration is in place. The name of the community is often situative and depends on who is asking (someone from a neighboring village, from the provincial center or from Kabul). Villages may be named after an influential person and may change when the name-sponsoring patron leaves. Some villages take a new name after a significant incident, for example a landslide. It is furthermore often unclear to which administrative or territorial unit a certain name refers: The water-using community of a village can differ from the land-owning community and the community council may only represent a part of the village households. The fact that names and borders of communities are blurred does not, however, mean that communities as functional units are undefined or weak. Of the 80 communities surveyed, 59 were (locally) clearly defined political and social units with representative institutions. The remaining villages, while lacking a body of collective representation, had no problem indicating agreed borders of their village to the external researchers. Hence, the GPS coordinates of the villages were recorded, names, alternative names, and former names collected and the different bodies of political representation of the village identified and recorded.

Second, the profiles established basic demographic data, which unfortunately is not readily available. In this context, it should be noted that Afghans in rural areas have over the course of the last century often resisted attempts by the central government to collect census data. Often, enumerators had to interview village functionaries capable of reading and writing and asked them for data. A good starting point was usually the headmaster of the school. The profiles contain data on numbers of households, numbers of families, ethnic composition, migrants, and returned internally displaced

⁹ The questionnaire is attached in the appendix, see pp. 30 – 54.

persons.

Third, the profiles collect data on resource endowment and infrastructure. For example, we collected data on access to irrigated land and pasture, on schools, health care institutions, and energy supply within or near the community, and on access to markets.

Fourth, the profiles collect data on aid input. Specifically, we asked enumerators to compile a list of development projects which the community had participated in during the past two years. Aid input is the study variable for this research, and we collected and used data from as many different sources as possible. This is because answers to these questions are likely to be given with a hidden strategic agenda. A community that reports high level of aid inputs may receive less aid in the next round; hence, interlocutors tend to understate the real levels of received aid. For example, in the village of Chumchugjar interlocutors initially stated that they received nothing over the past two years, then with a little insistence and looking around, we could identify seven projects, the highest score for any village surveyed.

Fifth, the village profiles present information on the socio-political organization of the community (communal governance). Specifically, we asked about the village's leadership, about military commanders, whether there was a traditional shura or a community development council (the so called "development shura").

Finally, we asked about recent migration patterns that may have affected the community, about displaced persons that returned after 2001. We also asked about violent conflicts that affected the community.

We also compiled mantequa and district profiles, which cover similar topics as the village profiles. Finally, we produced community history profiles. These add historical depths to the community profiles. A community history consists of 14 questions referring to development over the last 40 years. It allows identifying changes in agricultural production, trade patterns, off-farm economic opportunities, migration patterns, and political affiliation of the community.

Quarterly Reports

The quarterly reports are semi-structured reports, to be filled in by local correspondents four times a year. The correspondents were trained in a weeks-long workshop in Kabul.

These reports cover 40 out of 80 communities.¹⁰

The quarterly reports record major events and significant changes that affect the dependent variables, but that are not captured in village profiles and surveys, such as major new development initiatives, outbreaks of violence, military operations, natural disasters, etc. While the surveys and the profiles provide "snapshots" of a given situation at a given time, the quarterly reports provide information on change and allow for process-tracing. They may even serve as a source for constructing time series.

The standardized questions focus on political leadership and violent conflicts within the communities, on violent conflicts affecting the community, on threats and developments that affect the security situation of the community, on relations between the community and state officials and state institutions, especially instances of compliance and non-

¹⁰ A full coverage would have been desirable, but was not feasible given the logistical difficulties and the budget constraints.

compliance with state rules, and, most importantly, on new projects and new aid flows that affect the community.

Qualitative Case Studies

A fourth method for data collection is to conduct qualitative case studies. For many complex social situations it is true that valid information is not easily obtained via standardised questionnaires. Often, more subtle qualitative methods are required to understand what drives social change: the incentives of actors, the rules and institutions informing the strategies of actors, and possible causal links with political, social, and economic framework conditions. This approach is, however, more time-consuming than collecting quantitative data by questionnaire. We plan to conduct a series of qualitative studies in order to investigate cases of surprising successes or surprising failures. Data from the survey and from the profiles will be used to identify cases where development aid seemed to work better or worse than in most other communities. In-depth case studies will help to uncover the causes of these outcomes.

Secondary Sources

Finally, we complement our data by mining existing sources of data collections, such as CiMiC village profiles, EON Baseline Survey 2006, ISAF ACSP (Afghanistan Country Stability Picture) as of June 2007, NRVA 2003-05 (National Risk & Vulnerability Assessment), UNAMA “Who does what where” development input mapping North-East (database updated only until 2005), and other classified sources. The focus is on socio-economic data that completes our own survey data, on security related incidents, and on aid inputs. In order to ascribe secondary data to our selected communities, it is necessary to be able to identify the exact geographical position to which the data refers. In other words, data from secondary sources must be matched with one of the communities within our sample. Often, this is not possible. In other cases, it is feasible, but it is an extremely time consuming process. However, there is a lot of valuable data being collected, and it is worth a major effort to collate this data in a common database.

Overview over Data Sources

Method	Description	Justification
I. Surveys		
Base Line Survey	2,034 respondents (head of households) from 77 villages ¹¹ , 57 questions	Primary data source
Follow-up Survey		Follow-up allows to record changes over time.
II. Profiles		Profiles collect data that refers to the community, to community clusters or to the district as a whole. Variables relating to the community can be constructed from such profiles.
Village Profiles	80 village profiles with basic data on the political, economic, and social organization of the community in space, demography, availability and distribution of resources, vulnerability, development aid inputs, incidents of conflicts and conflict processing. The focus is on the present situation and, for aid input as well as conflicts, the past two years.	
Village Histories	80 village histories provide information on main political, economic, and social developments over the past two generations (40 years). Main shocks and conflicts that had an impact on the whole community are captured.	
Sub-district Community Cluster Profiles	In Afghanistan, there are two organizationally relevant settlement clusters between the village level and district level: the qaria (main village-cluster in the plains) and mantaqa ("valley" in the highlands). 19 qaria/mantaqa profiles provide information on the social, economic, and political setup of those non-formalised organizational clusters.	
District Profiles	Four district profiles provide background on demography, political actors, and government-institutions as well as main development programs in the district.	
III. Quarterly Reports	A sub-sample of 40 communities is visited by trained local researchers once every three months. In a semi-structured interview with local focal points (key informants), information is gathered on	The Quarterly Community Reporting allows tracing exceptional events and sudden changes within the communities. Such observations are not reflected in the two surveys.

¹¹ In order not to exceed the agreed limit of 2,000 respondent interviews, by far not all 80 target villages were eventually surveyed. Three villages of the smallest district, Aliabad, had to be dropped for the survey. Those villages were, however, captured by the community profiling teams.

	relevant political and economic developments within the community. Special focus is paid to the way, in which identified conflicts are processed over time. The results are reported in a structured and partially pre-coded quarterly reporting template.	
IV. Qualitative Case Studies (based on ethnographical probes)	Started in 2007, to be finished in 2008	Case studies explain outlier cases and add causal explanations by process-tracing.
V. Other Secondary Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CiMiC village profiles - EON Baseline Survey 2006 - EON Conflict Assessment 2006 (useless) - ISAF ACSP (Afghanistan Country Stability Picture) as of June 2007 - NRVA 2003-05 (National Risk & Vulnerability Assessment) - [ISAF & UN actors and incident tables] - UNAMA "Who does what where" development input mapping North-East (database updated only until 2005) <p>[for the UN documents the request for data is ongoing]</p>	Adds complementary data to the survey data and allows for cross-checking. It is necessary to ascribe data from the secondary sources to our unit of analysis (the 77 communities).

Analysis: Explaining Change

Inferring Causality

The objective of this research is to assess the impact of development aid. Put differently, we want to find out whether development aid or other factors have caused those changes in which we are interested. Hence, we are interested in causality. Causality or causation is usually defined as the relationship between one event (called cause) and another event (called effect) which is the consequence (result) of the first.

The gold standard for causation is the randomized experiment: take a large number of communities, randomly divide them into two groups, provide one group with development aid and prohibit the other group from receiving aid, then determine whether one group shows the effects that development aid was thought to produce.

Quite evidently, however, it is hardly possible to perform such an experiment in most contexts. It may be neither ethical nor politically wise to deny a group of communities development aid. And in most cases, communities differ from each other and are exposed to different external factors; hence, one precondition of the experiment – that units of analysis must be alike – is hardly ever met. With regard to our sample – the 77 communities in North East Afghanistan - there is no clear-cut divide between communities that have received aid projects, and those that have not. In fact, the overwhelming majority of communities received some aid, although the mix of projects differed.¹² No community received no aid at all. Furthermore, communities do differ with regard to many factors. Hence, the natural experiment could not be performed.

However, the basic logic of how to infer causality still applies: Assessing the impact of an intervention on its environment requires, first, that we observe changes, and second, that we can plausibly attribute these changes to the intervention whose impact we are investigating. It follows that we must define a strategy that allows to monitor changes over time, and to insulate the causal factors we are interested in from other possible factors. Research strategies, therefore, rest on two types of comparison: The first compares changes over time; the second compares a treatment group (the group that benefits from an intervention) with a control group (the group that did not benefit from the intervention). However, even if our findings correspond with our expectations, we can still not be sure that these changes are indeed attributable to development aid. Hence, a sound research strategy requires that we find a way to make sure that other factors that may have caused the observed changes are similar for both groups. For example, communities within both groups should have similar access to land, be located in similar climatic regions, and have similar access to off-farm sources of income. They should, ideally, only differ with regard to the one development project that benefited one group but not the other.

Summing up, inferring causality requires that we trace changes over time, that we can define a treatment group and a control group, and that other factors are similar for both groups. In reality, these conditions are hardly ever met. Hence, there is a need for auxiliary strategies.

Triangulation: Qualitative, Quantitative, and GIS

For complex research, it is often advisable to rely on more than one method. In the social sciences, the term **triangulation** is used to indicate that more than one method is applied in a study with a view to double (or triple) checking results. This is also called "cross examination". The idea is that one can be more confident of a result if different methods lead to the same result.

¹² When we used the expert-based measures, we found the following picture:

With regard to aid modality, we found that three villages received a project related to organizational development, ten villages received one or more capacity building projects, nineteen villages received direct aid, and sixty villages received one or more infrastructure projects.

When we looked at the sectors, we found that one village received projects related to building government capacity, three villages received one project with impact on the health sector; six villages received one project with impact on sustainable economic development; ten villages received projects with impact on the educational sector; 15 villages received one project with impact on the electricity sector; 22 villages received projects with impact on rural development, 28 villages received projects with impact on roads and bridges, and 34 villages received projects with impact on the water and sanitation sector.

For this research, we use different methods, and we have already briefly mentioned them when we discussed our data mining strategy. It should be noted, however, that for all methods, the basic underlying logic requirements of how to infer causality remain the same. Whatever method the researcher chooses, inferring causality will always require that changes over time can be related to different characteristics displayed by the units of analysis. Also, all methods alike require that the researcher defines the concepts he or she is interested in and then defines measurements for these concepts. This process is referred to as operationalization.

A first method is to conduct qualitative case studies. As we have argued before, for many complex social situations it is true that valid information is not easily obtained via standardized questionnaires. Often, more subtle qualitative methods are required to understand incentives of actors, rules, and institutions informing their strategies and possible causal links with political, social, and economic framework conditions. This approach is, however, more time-consuming than collecting quantitative data by questionnaire. Well-crafted case studies can be used for comparative purposes, but they also are useful in order to trace a specific process. The general method of process tracing is to generate and to analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects. Process tracing assesses causal mechanisms (rather than causal effects). In process tracing, the researcher investigates whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case. The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable and an outcome (dependent variable).

A second method we found to be tremendously helpful is geographic information system (GIS) based analysis. GIS is a system for capturing, storing, analyzing, and managing data and associated attributes which are spatially referenced. GIS is a tool that allows users to relate all sorts of data to a specific geographic location. For example, GIS allows displaying all villages on a map that have, according to our survey data, lower than average support for foreign troops. This information can now be related to other data that is stored in the system: Climatic conditions, predominant type of agriculture, or patrolling frequency of the German PRT. Researchers will detect any overlap (or lack thereof) between these different characteristics.

Thirdly, we rely on statistical techniques in order to identify general patterns; one technique that we use is regression analysis. The general purpose of multiple regressions is to learn more about the relationship between several independent or predictor variables and a dependent variable.

In the following sections, we describe in more detail how we have reached the findings that we have documented in Zürcher,C; Köhler,J; Böhnke,J.(2007): *Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Interim Report. Evaluation Reports 028*. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. As we have not yet processed all data, and qualitative field work has not yet been completed, we use data from the survey and from the community profiles as a start. The method of analysis is predominately based on statistical instruments. Although we document one specific example here, we think that we discuss a range of problems that is common to most impact assessments.

Our example refers to North East Afghanistan, consisting of the four provinces Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and Badakhshan. These provinces cover together 85.600 square kilometres (13% of Afghanistan). We surveyed communities in the districts of Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Taloqan, and Warsaj.

Measuring Aid

A problem that warrants explanation is related to how we measure development aid. There are different ways of measuring development aid, and none is perfect. One way is to simply take the money spent on development as a measure for aid. There are several problems with this option. For one, it is very difficult to get accurate budget data of all development agencies active in the region. Furthermore, most budgets of development agencies do not break down figures to districts or community level. Finally, different agencies may have very different overheads costs: agency A spends 1,000 U.S. dollars on community A, and agency B spends 1,000 U.S. dollars on community B, but it may be that community A receives a net value of 600 U.S. dollars, and community B of only 300 U.S. dollars, due to higher transaction costs in agency A. These differences in overhead costs distort data unless we have a good way for correcting for this distortion.

Another alternative way is to measure development aid where it is actually received. This is logistically much more demanding, since it requires that one actually counts projects at the communal level, but it has the advantage that aid is directly attributable to our units of analysis. For this paper, we decided to measure development aid at the receiving end.

Eventually we decided to use four different measures for aid. First, we asked respondents in what sectors their household had been a beneficiary of development aid.¹³ Second, we asked respondents to tell us in what sectors their community as a whole had been a beneficiary of development projects. These measurements are respondent based and they reflect not necessarily the actual numbers of projects, but rather whether respondents think that their community has profited from development cooperation in a given sector. Such a measure is by default subjective; but we think that it is justified in so far as the remembered aid actually reflects the utility of a given project to the community better than the actual amount of money spent on the project. Likewise, one could argue that the utility of a school to the community is not increased if the school was expensive to build, nor is the utility of a well reduced if the well was cheap. In other words, for our purpose it is more useful to know whether most respondents remember that a well has been built in their community than knowing that this well has cost 10,000 or 20,000 U.S. dollars.

In addition we also created two expert-based measures. We asked our survey teams to establish lists of development projects that were implemented in each of the 77 communities of our sample, thereby differentiating between sectors and modality of aid

¹³ For the household, the sectors were: food aid, training/advice, salary/rent, credit, others; for the community: food aid, training/advice, schooling, electricity supply, jobs, agricultural extension services, roads & bridges, drinking water, irrigation.

projects.¹⁴ These measures are to a certain extent less perception driven and more objective.

Once we collected data on these four measures, we then cross-checked whether they pull in the same direction. Although they show considerable variation, we find that they are likely to have the same tendencies, thereby indicating that respondent-based measures and expert-based measures actually capture the same underlying reality.¹⁵

What is "Much" Aid?

A second problem relates to our qualification of "much" and "little" aid. This is not a problem, as long as the measurement is based on spending. In this case, higher spending per unit simply means more aid, lower spending less aid. But for the reason mentioned above, we did not use spending as a measurement. Our respondent based measures reflect whether respondents thought that their household or their community had profited from development activities in a given sector. Hence, we define "much aid" not as the number of projects, but as the perception of whether the community has profited or not from development cooperation in a given sector.

Data exploration revealed that communities received quite different mixes of development aid. For example, 5,9 percent of the communities had received food aid (112 of 120 cases in Warsaj); 5,5 percent training/advice/capacity building (50 cases Aliabad, two in Imam Sahib, 28 in Taloqan, 32 in Warsaj), 46,5% of communities had profited from schooling projects, 14,2% from electricity (269 of 289 cases in Warsaj), 65,9% from projects related to roads and bridges, 2,5 percent from projects aimed at creating jobs (13 cases in Imam Sahib, 37 in Warsaj); 16% had received projects in agricultural extension services, 65,9% reported having received projects related to drinking water, and 24,1% related to irrigation (mostly in Imam Sahib).¹⁶ We also found clear regional patterns: Food aid, electricity and jobs are predominately found in Warsaj, whereas irrigation projects are predominately found outside Warsaj. Training and advice is un-

¹⁴ The sectors were: government capacity, roads & bridges, rural development, educational sector, health sector, water and sanitation, electricity, sustainable economic development. Hence, they overlap with the respondent based measures, but we added government capacity, sustainable economic development, and health. We had fewer sections in the questionnaire because we did not want to overload the questionnaire, and because there are until now only very few projects in these three additional sectors.

Categories for aid modality were: infrastructure; capacity building; organizational development; direct aid; other.

Projects can have only one modality, but they can relate to various sectors. Hence, we can use the modality entry for measuring the overall number of projects in a given community; the numbers of projects in a specific sector reflects the sectoral focus of the development portfolio for a given community.

¹⁵ For future research we plan to include also budget-based measures and more qualitative data. However, at the time of writing, this data has not yet been available.

¹⁶ Figures relating to projects of which the individual household profited are: 10.8 percent of all households said that they received food aid (173 cases of 219 in Warsaj); 1.7 percent training/advice (19 of 35 households in Aliabad); two percent salary/rent (36 of 41 cases in Warsaj; the other five in Aliabad); 3.1 percent credit (most cases in Aliabad and Warsaj); 13.3 percent other services.

derrepresented in Imam Sahib. All other variables seem to be free from severe regional accumulations.

Factor and reliability analysis showed that there is not one dimension underlying these variables. Hence, we could not create an index. In the end, we decided to group the communities in different categories, reflecting the mix of projects they received. For this, we used Latent Class Analysis (LCA). LCA is a statistical method for finding subtypes of related cases (latent classes) from multivariate categorical data. LCA has the advantage over factor analysis/cluster analysis that no scaling properties have to be assumed. LCA estimates different classes of units of analysis that can be characterized by a common pattern of category probabilities. The easiest case is the so called "One Class Solution" that corresponds to the usual sample-mean based analytic methods. In this solution it is assumed that all units of analysis stem from the same distribution. In most cases this means-based solution does not yield the most accurate description of the data. In LCA solutions with an ascending number of classes, class belongings are estimated and their fit to the data is evaluated via the probability that the estimated model produced the data (so called "likelihood"). This fit is compared to the number of parameters needed to estimate this solution. The solution which indicates the best fit with the least possible parameters is the number of classes to be used to describe the data most effectively.¹⁷

Using LCA we were able group the units of analysis into five classes: Communities in the first class (expected class size is 30%) are characterized by respondents perceptions as having profited from development projects dealing with drinking water, schooling and electricity. The number of respondents that see their communities having profited in these sectors is above the mean. With regard to roads and bridges, communities have received less than the mean. Communities in this class have received no projects related to irrigation and food aid at all. Finally, the number of projects related to extension services and training is close to the mean. Summing up, respondents in this class report that their communities have profited mainly from drinking water, roads and bridges, and schooling projects.

We name this class **Drinking Water, Roads and Bridges, and Schooling**.

The second class (expected size 24%) reaches the lowest expected score, i.e. consists of the respondents reporting lesser development projects in any sector than the mean, except for irrigation projects which is close to the mean. No respondent in this class reports projects related to electricity, food aid or training. We name this class **Low Coverage**.

The third class (expected size 18%) consists of an above average number of respondents reporting development projects in the sectors of drinking water, roads and bridges, schooling and irrigation, as well as a slightly above average rate for extension services. They also report only very few projects related to electricity and food aid. In sum, communities in this class receive a high amount of projects. We name this class **High Coverage**.

The fourth class (expected size 17%) consists of respondents reporting that their communities profited from drinking water and (near to) average rates in roads and bridges, extension services and training. No project in the sectors schooling, irrigation, electricity, and food aid was reported. We name this class **Drinking Water and Roads and Bridges**.

¹⁷ We used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to evaluate the fit of the model. The BIC offsets the likelihood with the number of parameters. The more parsimonious the model, the better the BIC score.

The fifth class (expected size 13%) consists of communities that have higher than average numbers of projects related to electricity and food aid, and also road and bridges. The number of drinking water projects is less than average, and there is no irrigation project. The number of projects in schooling, extension services and training is close to the mean. We name this class **Roads and Bridges, Electricity, and Food Aid**.

The distribution of these classes is contingent of the district: 91.7 per cent of all cases belonging to class 5 are located in Warsaj, whereas most households in Imam Sahib belong to class 3.¹⁸

Independent Variables

Based on results of the LCA, we created a dummy variable for each class, reflecting the specific mix of development aid that a community received.

We also created a variable that reflects the number of development projects that the individual household received (Direct Aid Score). We used question 56 (“Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation during the last two years?”). Since households were only rarely beneficiary of development projects, conducting a LCA on this variable yielded unsatisfactory results. Therefore, the qualitative information on which sectors the projects belonged to was dropped. Instead we constructed a score, coding „0“ when no help was received by the individual household, „1“ if projects in one sector were received, „2“ if projects in two or more sectors were received.

Next we created a variable for the ethnic belonging (Pashtu, Uzbek, Tajik, Nomad¹⁹) of the respondents. Some scholars argue that attitudes toward foreign presence differ between ethnic groups, and that especially among Pashtu the mistrust towards the international peacebuilders may be greater than among minority groups. Creating dummies for Pashtu, Uzbek, Tajik, and Nomad allows for testing this assumption.

We also created a dummy (Periphery), indicating whether a community was easily accessible or remotely located. One way of thinking about the impact of peripheral location is that the more remote a village is, the more cautious it may be toward the peacebuilding mission. On the other hand, it could also be that remote villages are more in need of development aid and less exposed to propaganda efforts by anti-western or anti-central government forces. Hence, we wanted to empirically investigate whether peripheral location was a valid predictor.

We created a dummy for the four districts Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Taloqan, and Warsaj. There is not one specific hypothesis that we expected to test with the district dummies. Rather, we took the district dummy as a black-box for the combined effect of other, unobserved influences. If one or all district dummies are significant, as we expected it to be, we take this as a marker for an idiosyncratic combination of factors that is intrinsic to this given district and which then requires additional research. At the very least,

¹⁸ We refrain from reporting results from individual communities due to lack of space. We looked at the levels of unanimity among respondents within a given community. We qualify a community as unanimous if 90% or more of all respondents report the same number of projects. We find that overall 36 of the communities qualify as unanimous. (29% in Aliabad, 30% in Imam Sahib, 55% in Taloqan and 30% in Warsaj)

¹⁹ Strictly speaking Nomad is not an ethnic group, but a socio-professional group, defined by the livelihood. Most are Pashtu.

significant district dummies signal that conditions differ across districts, hence, development aid should study these differences and design policies accordingly.

A dummy variable (NSP) was created for communities in which NSP (National Solidarity Program) projects were already implemented. In Afghanistan, community driven development is a major part of the international community's strategy for rebuilding the country. The so-called National Solidarity Program has focused on community participation through Community Development Councils (CDC) that have begun a wide range of projects, from irrigation and water supplies to capacity building for local governance. Creating a dummy for NSP lets us assess whether NSP communities show different characteristics.

Next, we computed two variables that capture communal ties and communal mobilizations. The Village Help Index captures the cohesiveness and mobilization capacities of a community. It is based on the perception of respondents with regard to how easy it is in their village to get help, for example, for harvesting, and what one was expected to give in return. A lower score reflects that one rather has to pay for help; a higher score indicates that one rather has to return the favor (mutual exchange).

A Village Norm Index was created, based on whether respondents thought that the community should correct families whose behavior deviate from communal norms, and whether respondents expected social sanction in case a family would not participate in hashar or similar social obligations.

Finally, we created a variable for vulnerability, indicating how much a community is threatened by natural disasters, and a variable indicating the size of the village.

Dependent Variables

In this first round of analysis, we created four dependent variables. First, we tested the effect of our study variable (development aid) on respondents' attitude towards the activities of the peacebuilders. The dependent variable here is the Western Value Index (based on Q55 as described in part one of this report). We then turned to predict the levels of threat perception, using the Threat Perception Index (based on Q12). Next, we tested whether development aid has had an impact on the overall satisfaction with international actors' contribution to development within communities. Here, we used the scores of question Q44, which asked respondents to rate the contribution of different actors, international, state, and private, to the provision of basic services. Finally, we investigated whether development aid has had an impact on how respondents see the state (using Q44 and Q54).

The following table gives an overview over these variables. The first column depicts the concepts that together constitute the general model. The next column lists the sub-concepts (that is, aspects of the general concepts that we needed to measure separately). The column "proxy-indicator" reports how we measure the concepts. The final column gives the data sources.

Concepts	Sub-Concepts	Proxy Indicator	Data Source
Security	Threat Perception	Threat Perception Index: Question 12	Survey
	Attitudes towards Foreign Organizations	Western Value Index: Question 55	Survey
Communal Organizational Capacities	Solidarity	Village Help Index	Survey
	Social Control	Village Norm Index: Q38c, Q39c, e	Survey
State Services	Satisfaction with Basic Services	Q44	Survey
	Satisfaction with Administration	Q54	Survey
	State Capacity in Conflict Regulation	Q18	Survey
	“Justness” of Administration in Conflict Regulation	Q19	Survey
Development Cooperation	Mix of Projects in Different Sectors for Community	Dummy variable based on a Latent Class Analysis, using Q57	Survey
	Number of Projects in Different Sectors for Households	Index, constructed from Q56	Survey
	Number of Projects in Different Sectors for Community	Index, constructed from Community Profile	Community Profile
	Number of Projects in Different Aid Modality Categories	Index, constructed from Community Profile	Community Profile
Other Factors	Ethnicity	Dummy Variable	Survey
	Peripheral Location	Dummy Variable	Community Profile
	District	Dummy Variable	Community Profile
	Vulnerability	Dummy Variable	Community Profile
	NSP Community	Dummy Variable	Community Profile
Preexisting Local Capacities	Level of Development in April 2007	Index, based on factor analysis, using Q45 and 46	Survey
Conflict Processing		[no suitable indicator could be derived from the existing data sources so far]	
Resource Endowment	Resource Endowment of the Village	Index, created from Community Profile	Community Profile
	Resource Endowment of the Household	Index, created from Q9	Survey

Findings

Here, we summarize the main findings derived from the analysis. For more detail see Zürcher,C; Koehler,J; Böhnke,J.(2007): Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Interim Report. *Evaluation Reports 028*. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

1. We find evidence that development aid has a positive impact on attitudes towards the peacebuilding mission. Communities that have broadly profited from development aid show greater support for international actors and their objectives.
2. Development aid, however, does not lead to a lower threat perception. Levels of received aid do not influence the levels of threats that people perceive, indicating that development aid per se has little impact on objective security threats.
3. Threat perceptions differ between districts. People in Aliabad feel more threatened, and they fear the Taliban. People in Imam Sahib feel least threatened, and here the main threat is, as in other districts, organized crime.
4. We also find no evidence that development aid has so far increased Afghan state capacities in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually absent as a problem solver and service provider. Most Afghans think that the state has not contributed to the provision of basic services and does not look after the needs of the rural population. This perception is unaffected by levels of received development aid.
5. An overwhelming majority thinks that security has very much increased over the last two years. Most Afghans credit foreign forces with this progress.
6. Despite substantial progress in security, one fifth of all households feel that their physical security is threatened, but the main threat does not stem from Taliban or other armed forces, but from organized crime. Five percent also said that they feel threatened by foreign forces.
7. International development agencies are also widely credited by Afghans for bringing along positive and widespread changes in basic services for many communities, most notably with regard to drinking water, roads, and schooling. Progress in other fields seems to be much slower. Afghans also support activities of international actors that are usually associated with Western values which are often seen as being at odds with Afghan values. There is much support for state schooling, girls' enrolment in schools, and off-farm job opportunities for men and women.
8. Despite these positive assessments of foreign involvement, many Afghans remain cautious. 43% of households thought the presence of foreign troops in general posed a threat to the local way of life and Islamic values in the community, and 21% of respondents thought that foreign developmental aid threatens the local way of life and Islamic values.

Obstacles

This last section describes some of the obstacles that we have encountered so far. The section should be read as sort of prelude to a lessons-learned chapter, which we will be happy to provide when this research project reaches completion. As of now, we are at best halfway.

We underestimated the logistical difficulties of a country like Afghanistan. Apart from the usual difficulties related to transportation and communication, we were surprised to learn that many villages had no names or various names; maps are rare and not up-to-date; district borders are constantly changing. These facts make the seemingly simple a real challenge: randomized sampling without maps, lists of villages and population sizes become adventurous. It became difficult to establish the locality of the 77 communities that we included in our sample. We ended up preparing own maps (based on Soviet maps) and widely using GPS to locate villages.

We overestimated the quality of the data that is available on ongoing development aid projects. Data that has been shared by various state and non-state agencies was often of very poor quality; not all organizations seem to record data, not all seem to be willing to share. We ended up relying on data that we ourselves compiled; it remains to be seen whether we will be able to use budget data from aid agencies for additional tests.

Until now we could not find a simple and straightforward measure for the material well-being of households and communities. Although we invested considerably in these questions (around 15% of the survey was devoted to these issues), the results are not satisfying. We asked about cattle, land, type of land, and consumer goods but none of these measures allows creating a simple index that we could use to compare the overall material well-being of communities. This may be because conditions differ too much between communities. Although we included markers for climate, geographical location, type of agriculture, or market access, we were not able to correct for this. It remains to be seen where we can impute measures for the well-being of households and communities from other data sources (e.g. vulnerability studies).

Finally, all questions in the questionnaire related to actual, concrete events of violent conflicts within the communities did not work; evidently, such events cannot be surveyed by means of standardized questionnaires. Here we will have to rely on qualitative work.

Appendix

Summary of Conflict Assessment North East Afghanistan

The following section summarizes the main points of a conflict assessment of North East Afghanistan. For more details, see: Zürcher,C; Koehler,J; (2007): Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan:Prestduy. *Evaluation Working Paper*. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.²⁰

The North East Region

The North East of Afghanistan consists of the four provinces Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and Badakhshan. These provinces cover together 85.600 square kilometres (13 percent of Afghanistan). Kunduz borders Tajikistan; Badakhshan, by far the largest of the four provinces, borders Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan.

Recent History

After the withdrawal of the Soviet Army in 1989 the three North Eastern provinces mostly fell to Jamiat-e-Islami. From an all-Afghan perspective the provinces belonged to the winning (non-Pashtun) Mujaheddin factions that took over power in Kabul in 1992 – the predominantly Tajik Jamiat, the mostly Uzbek Junbish-i Milli and the Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat. The alliance was short-lived, however, and after their breakup the Northern provinces deteriorated into a battlefield between Junbish and Jamiat forces (1994-96). Between 1998 and 2000 the Pashtun-dominated Taliban pushed violently into the Northern Provinces. By September 2000 Kunduz was entirely under Taliban control and most of Takhar had been taken, as staging ground for Taliban operations against Badakhshan, the only remaining province under Northern Alliance control.

Not only was the rural population shaken by civil war between Taliban and the Northern Alliance and by skirmishes and infighting between local commanders; in 1998 a devastating drought set in that lasted until 2003. Many households had to sell off all assets, including the livestock that traditionally served as a liquid capital. The US-lead invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 changed the political-military power balance in those ethnically diverse provinces. The commanders of the Northern Alliance, who despite the daunting Taliban threat had been continuously involved in internal feuds, swiftly

²⁰ Examples of conflict assessment on the sub-national level in Afghanistan are still rare. A few examples are:

Gosztanyi, Kristóf and Fararoon, Romin (2004). *Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Afghanistan-Badakhshan, Afghanistan*. Eschborn: ARC GbR, Berlin, for GTZ Eschborn.

Koehler, Jan (2005). *Conflict processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan*. PAL (Project Alternative Livelihood), GTZ, Jalalabad.

Koehler, Jan and Zürcher, Christoph (2005). *Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan*. Jalalabad, Berlin: ARC GbR, for Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL).

Schetter, Conrad, Glassner, Rainer and Karaokhail, Massod (2006). *Understanding Local Violence. Security Arrangements in Kandahar, Kunduz and Paktia (Afghanistan)*. Bonn: Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, Amu Darya Series Paper No. 3

took full control over the provinces. In this process that coins the political landscape of the three provinces until today, the Shura-i Nazar (a splinter group of Jamiat) of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud and his successor Mohammed Qasim Fahim gained the upper hand but they had to share power with other Mujaheddin factions of local influence, such as Jamiat of Burhanuddin Rabbani, Junbish-e Milli of Abdul Rashid Dostum and Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. With the diminishing official influence of leading representatives of the former Northern Alliance after the presidential elections in 2004 the role of some younger former commanders, rising up in the ranks of the new state with Coalition and Central State backing, increased.

Opium Poppy Cultivation

Takhar and Kunduz are not traditionally opium poppy cultivating provinces. Kunduz in particular has, however, been an important hub for the long-distance trade in opiates. Badakhshan on the other hand has some tradition of opium cultivation and became the leading opium and later heroine producing province after the Taliban banned the cultivation in their sphere of control in 2001. When pressure mounted on traditional opium poppy planting provinces in Eastern Afghanistan in 2005, production increased again in Badakhshan. There is reasonable concern that poppy cultivation will also increase in remoter areas of Takhar as a spill-over from Badakhshan.

Privatized and Localized Power Structures

Power structures in most provinces are characterized by the fact that holding an official position is regarded by the elites as a guarantor for power and as an important material as well as symbolic resource. The intermingling of pursuing personal interests and holding a state position directly affects the security situation. There is no universally accepted communal authority which is capable of checking and balancing the arbitrary power of individuals. Power structures are often locally very diverse and highly dependent on a locally influential "big man". They often resemble mini-fiefdoms.

Weakness of the State

The key problem **is the weakness of the central state vis-à-vis entrenched regional powerbrokers**. The central state lacks the capacity to deliver public goods; however, these goods are in high demand. Local populations expect protection from arbitrariness of local powerbrokers; increased land security, development aid, and, after two decades of war and against the backdrop of recent deterioration of the security situation, protection of their physical security. In opium cultivating regions the drug economy is a lifeline for farmers and not widely considered to be a wrongful activity, but drug money also goes to regional power brokers and strengthens, in the long run, bad local governance.

Spoilers and Veto Players

For analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish potential spoilers and veto players into five categories. These are: first order warlords, the Taliban-led insurgents; Al-Qaeda fighters, which may or may not operate with the Taliban; entrepreneurs in the drug economy (some of which have already a position within the provincial state administration); local powerbrokers/second order warlords.

All of these groups have ties to organized, drug related crime. Contrary to widespread perceptions it is the latter two groups that pose the most imminent threat to statebuilding. This is because a state may win a war against insurgents; but it is impossible to build-up a state against widespread, open or diffuse, resistance of regional powerbrokers who command the loyalty of, or at least the exercise power over, local populations. Afghanistan's security today is most threatened by the fact that provincial

strongmen for the most part retained their capability for organizing violence, and that they are, for the time being, not willing to engage in a long-term relationship with central statebuilders.

Trends

Beginning in 2005 and accelerating in 2006, we have observed a negative trend in Afghanistan. The security situation has been deteriorating. This is attributed to Taliban-insurgency gaining strength in the South and South East, occasional Al-Quaeda attacks, and entrepreneurs in the drug economy who feel that a climate of insecurity and state weakness is good for business. The targets of attacks are, in this order, U.S. forces, Afghan army and police, other international forces, and, occasionally, soft targets such as national and international staff of development organizations. This is a marked negative trend, but it is not yet a qualitative change in the overall situation.

Statebuilding is Key

Statebuilding is still key: What is needed is a stable state that has coercive capacities, that is seen as not arbitrary, and that delivers quick and visible development to the rural population. Specifically, there is a high demand among the rural population for a state that delivers security, visible material improvement, increased good local governance and that helps strengthening conflict processing capacities at regional level.

Relevance Criteria for Development Cooperation from a Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) Perspective

Development cooperation

- should contribute to strengthening state capacities,
- must not support the emergence of a rentier state,
- should provide incentives and resources to regional powerbrokers and local populations in order to win their loyalty for the statebuilding process. Hence, CPPB projects should have an impact with a short to medium timeframe, and they should focus on target groups from provincial populations and provincial elites,
- should contribute to visible material improvement on the regional and local level, good local governance, security, and better conflict processing capacities,
- should have an impact within three years after implementation,
- should contribute to promoting alternative livelihoods. Eradication can do more harm than good, as long as the local population is neutral or friendly towards the state.

Questionnaire

سوالنامه QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire Passport (TO BE FILLED OUT AFTER COMPLETION OF THE INTERVIEW) بعد از ختم مصاحبه خانه پري شود				
			No. or code کود نمبر	
A1	No. of household (TO BE PUT DOWN BY SUPERVISOR) نمبر خانواده (توسط سوپر وایزر نوشته شود)			
A2	Province code اسم و کود ولایت	District code اسم و کود ولسوالي	Main Vil- lage/Mantaqa اسم قریه کلان/منطقه	Sub Village اسم و کود قریه فرعی
Phone number نمبر تېلفون				
A3	Interviewer (full name) اسم مصاحبه کننده			
A4	Checked by (full name) اسم چک کننده			
A5	Coder (full name) اسم کود دهنده			
A6	Operator (full name) اسم اپریتر			

A7. Date of interview: تاریخ مصاحبه / /2007

A8. [LANGUAGE] _____ لسان

A9.Length of interview _____ hour ساعت _____ دقیقه minute
وقتیکه مصاحبه در بر گرفت

Hello, my name is.../last and first name/. I represent a Public Opinion Research Centre from Kabul. We are currently conducting one of our surveys. We would like to ask you a number of questions – to know your opinion and to collect some information on your household. Our conversation will take about 60 minutes. Even if you would like to, we won't be able to mention your name in the report on the result of the survey. The answers are used only in the form of percentages and your participation in the research is going to be anonymous. You have the right to refuse from an interview, however, I ask you to help me do my work.

سلام ، اسم ما است و نمایندگی از (تحقیقات نظریات عامه مرکز کابل میکنم. فعلا ما به خاطر اجرائی یک سروی از شما چند سوال می پرسیم تا به نظر شما بفهمیم و معلومات را جمع اوری کنیم مصاحبه ما شاید 60 دقیقه را در بر خواهند گرفت. اسم شما را نوشته نه میکنیم شما حق دارید که بعضی سوالات راجع به خانواده شما را که نه میخواهید جواب بدهید، حق دارید که انرا مسترد کنید پس به این خاطر میخواهیم که با ما کمک کنید تا کار خود را انجام دهم.

Resource Endowment منابع:

I would like to ask some questions on the material wellbeing of your household. You can decline to answer any single question if you feel uncomfortable to provide information on the issue.

میخواهیم چند سوال را راجع به وضعیت خانواده شما بپرسم اگر شما در مورد تهیه معلومات بعضی از سوالها ناراحتی احساس میکنید میتوانید انرا رد کنید.

Q1.	How much rainfed land does your household own? زمین للمی خانواده شما	_____ jeribs (0.2 ha)
Q2.	How much irrigated land does your household own? زمین ابی خانواده شما	_____ jeribs (0.2 ha)
Q3.	How much rainfed land has your household under cultivation? زمین للمی تحت کشت	_____ jeribs (0.2 ha)
Q4.	How much irrigated land has your household under cultivation? زمین ابی تحت کشت	_____ jeribs (0.2 ha)
Q5.	How much land is being sharecropped by your household? اندازه زمین را که به دهقانی کشت کرده اید	_____ jeribs (0.2 ha)
Q6.	How much land has your household under mortgage / pawned out? اندازه زمین شما که گرو شده اند.	_____ jeribs (0.2 ha)

Q7. Did your household take last season a salaam credit? در فصل گذشته سلم به دست آورده اید

	Yes بلی	No نی	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	1	0	99	98

if so, are you able to pay it back?

اگر بلی، آیا شما قدرت تادیه آنرا دارید؟

	Yes بلی	No نی	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
b)	1	0	99	98

Q8. Please indicate how many of the following items your household owns.

لطفا نشان دهید که خانواده شما اشیای ذیل را به چه تعداد دارا میباشد

		Number تعداد	Don't know نمیدانیم	refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Sheep گوسفند		99	98
b)	Cows گاو		99	98
c)	Goat بز		99	98
d)	Donkeys مرکب		99	98
e)	Chicken مرغ		99	98
f)	TVs تلویزیون		99	98
g)	Generators جنریتر		99	98
h)	Cars موتر		99	98
i)	Trucks لاری		99	98
k)	Motorbikes موتر سیکل		99	98
l)	Bicycles بایسیکل		99	98
m)	Tractors تراکتور		99	98

Q9. Please indicate, which of the following statements indicates best the material well-being of your household.

لطفا نشان دهید که کدام يك از جملات ذیل وضعیت خانواده شما را خوب نشان داده میتواند

It's hard for us to even buy simple food products حتی خریدن غذای ساده هم برایم مشکل است	1
We can buy food products, but it's hard for us to buy new clothes or pay for social obligations. ما غذا را خریداری کرده میتوانیم، اما خریدن لباس جدید و پرداخت برای خوشی و غم برایم مشکل است	2
We can buy food products, clothes, and pay for social obligations, but we cannot afford such things as, for example, a new TV or refrigerator خریدن غذا، لباس جدید و پرداخت برای خوشی و غم کرده میتوانیم اما چیزهای دیگر مانند تلویزیون جدید، یخچال و غیره را خریدن نمیتوانیم	3
We can buy food, clothes, pay for social obligations, and buy such things as, for example, a new TV or refrigerator من میتوانیم که غذا، لباس، پرداخت برای خوشی و غم، بعضی اشیای دیگر مانند تلویزیون و یخچال خریداری نمایم	4
We can buy almost everything we want ما تقریباً هر آنچه را که بخواهیم خریدن میتوانیم	5
Don't know نمیدانم	99
Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Security امنیت

After a long period of instability and war in parts of Afghanistan the physical security of individuals and households may be an issue in your community. By security we mean a situation in which you and your household do not experience violence or are threatened by physical force.

پس از بی ثباتیها و جنگهای طولانی ، امنیت افراد و خانواده ها يك مسله مهم میباشد. هدف از امنیت اینست که شما و خانواده شما به خشونت و تهدید مواجه نشده باشید

Q10. Has security increased or decreased over the past two years in your village?
ایا در 2 سال گذشته امنیت قریه شما خوب شده و یا خراب ؟

Decreased very much زیاد خراب شده	Decreased somewhat يك اندازه خراب شده	Neither decreased nor increased نه خوب شده نه خراب	Increased somewhat كمي خوب شده	Increased very much بسیار خوب شده	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
1	2	3	4	5	99	98

Q11. Did the following actors contribute to these changes?
ایا ارگان های ذیل در این تغییرات سهمیم بودند

		Contributed negatively / decreased security سهم منفي داشت/ امنیت خراب شده	Neither negatively nor positively نه مثبت بود ني منفي	Contributed positively / increased security سهم مثبت داشت/ امنیت خوب شده	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	International Organizations ارگانهای بین المللی	1	2	3	99	98
b)	Foreign Forces قوه خارجی	1	2	3	99	98
c)	Local Commanders قوماندانان محلی	1	2	3	99	98
d)	Local Government حکومت محلی	1	2	3	99	98
e)	Provincial Government حکومت ولایتی	1	2	3	99	98
f)	Central Government حکومت مرکزی	1	2	3	99	98
g)	Village Shura شوری قریه	1	2	3	99	98

Q12. Please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups.
لطفا نشان دهید اگر شما از گروه های ذیل ترس داشته باشید

		Not afraid ترس ندارم	Somewhat afraid بعضي وقت می ترسم	Very afraid بسیار می ترسم	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Foreign forces قوه خارجی	1	2	3	99	98

b)	Afghan central security forces قوه امنیې مرکزی افغانی	1	2	3	99	98
c)	Provincial and district security forces قوه امنیې ولایتي و یا ولسوالي	1	2	3	99	98
d)	Taleban طالبان	1	2	3	99	98
e)	Local armed men افراد مسلح محلي	1	2	3	99	98
f)	External armed men افراد مسلح بیروني	1	2	3	99	98
g)	Criminal groups گروپ هاي جنایتکار	1	2	3	99	98
h)	Others و غیره	1	2	3	99	98

Q13. How many times have members of your household been threatened by or experienced violence over the past year and over the year before the past year.

در دو سال گذشته چند مرتبه اعضای فامیل شما تهدید شده و یا تحت تشدد قرار گرفته است

	From از طرف	Number of times in the past year تعداد مراتب در سال گذشته 2006	Number of times in the year before the past year تعداد مراتب در سال ما قبل 2005	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Foreign forces قوه خارجی			99	98
b)	Afghan central security forces قوه امنیې مرکزی افغانی			99	98
c)	Provincial and district security forces قوه امنیې ولایتي و یا ولسوالي			99	98
d)	Taleban طالبان			99	98
e)	Local armed men افراد مسلح محلي			99	98
f)	External armed men افراد مسلح بیروني			99	98
g)	Criminal groups گروپ جنایتکار			99	98
h)	family / relatives فامیل/ اقارب			99	98
i)	members of other tribes / clans اعضا قوم و یا قبيله دیگر			99	98
j)	Others و غیره			99	98

Q14. Have you heard about the PRT in Kunduz? [INTERVIEWER: PLEASE MARK WHETHER RESPONDENT REALLY KNOWS ABOUT THE PRT] Yes بلي =1 No نی =0

ایا شما راجع به پی ار تی کندز شنیده اید

IF NOT → Q15. اگر نی به سوال 15 بروید

IF Yes: I will read you two statements; please indicate to what extent you agree with them! اگر بلي: دو جمله میخوانم: بگویند که به کدام اندازه با ان موافق هستید!

		Fully disagree كاملا مخالف	Rather disagree نسبتا مخالف	Rather agree نسبتا موافق	Fully agree كاملا موافق	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	The PRT improves peace and security in the area پی ار تی به صلح و امنیت بهبود میبخشد	1	2	4	5	99	98
b)	The PRT is contributing to development in the area پی ار تی در انکشاف منطقه سهیم میباشد	1	2	4	5	99	98

Conflict Processing تحلیل منازعات

In a village community there are often diverging interests that may lead to conflict, and often two parties disagree about what should be done. I now want to ask some questions about how your household and your community deals with arising conflicts and disputes.

در قریه علاقمندی های مختلف موجود میباشد که بعضی وقت منجر به منازعه میشود. و بعضی وقت دو جانب در مورد یک قضیه مخالف میشوند. ماچند سوال را میپرسیم که خانواده و جامعه شما در باره یک منازعه چه میکنند.

Q15. How many conflicts (disputes, fights, quarrels that reached public attention, e.g. were discussed in the mosques, referred to a shura or jirga, or local power holder or bilaterally negotiated between the parties) occurred during the last one year in your community?

در قریه شما چه تعداد منازعات (نزاع، جنگ که توجه عوام رایبه خود جلب کرده باشد و در مسجد فیصله شده باشد و یا به شوری و جرگه و یا قدرتمندان محلی محول شده باشد و یا بین جانبین مذاکره صورت گرفته باشد) در یک سال گذشته رخ داده است

تعداد منازعات Number of conflicts	نمیدانیم Don't know	جواب نداد Refused to answer
(*)	99	98

* (If the answer is 0 jump to Q18 اگر جواب = 0 باشد به سوال 18 بروید)

Q16. What were these conflicts mainly about? [OPEN ANSWERS; CODE AFTERWARDS]
این منازعات عمدتاً راجع به چه بود (سوال آزاد است بعداً کد شود)

Q17. In how many cases did at least one party apply physical force in order to win this conflict?

در چند منازعات کم از کم یک جانب قوه فیزیکی استعمال کرده تا برنده منازعه شود

Number of conflicts تعداد منازعات	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
	99	98

Q18. If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [ASK AND MARK SPECIFIC INSTITUTION ONLY, RANK THE ORDER OF INSTITUTIONS 1 TO 3]
 اگر شما در منازعات منابع طبیعی (اب، زمین، جنگل، چراگاه) دخیل میباشید برای حل منازعه در مرحله اول به کدام ارگان مراجعه می نمایید (پرساں کنید و 1-3 ارگان را به ترتیب اهمیت نشانی کنید).

a)	Local shura شورې محل	i)	Commander قوماندان	
b)	Jirga جرگه	k)	NGO موسسه	
c)	Khan/Arbab خان/ارباب	l)	Provincial authorities مسولین ولایتي	
d)	Qazi قاضي	m)	Central authorities مسولین مرکزی	
e)	Elders کلان قریه	n)	Other [SPECIFY BELOW] و غیره در ذیل مشخص کنید	
f)	Mullah ملا	o)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
g)	District Shura شورې ولسوالي	p)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98
h)	Wolliswol ولسوال			

OTHER و غیره: _____

Q19. In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way?

به نظر شما، آیا شما فکر میکنید که ارگانهای ذیل منازعات را منصفانه حل میکند

		Never هیچ وقت	Rarely کم وقت	Sometimes بعضی وقت	Always همیشه	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Local shura شورې محل	1	2	3	4	99	98
b)	Jirga جرگه	1	2	3	4	99	98
c)	Khan خان	1	2	3	4	99	98
d)	Qazi قاضي	1	2	3	4	99	98
e)	Elders کلان قریه	1	2	3	4	99	98
f)	Mullah ملا	1	2	3	4	99	98
g)	District Shura شورې ولسوالي	1	2	3	4	99	98
h)	Wolliswol ولسوال	1	2	3	4	99	98
i)	Commander قوماندان	1	2	3	4	99	98
k)	NGO موسسه	1	2	3	4	99	98
l)	Provincial authorities مسولین ولایتي	1	2	3	4	99	98
m)	Central authorities مسولین مرکزی	1	2	3	4	99	98
n)	Other [SPECIFY BELOW] و غیره در ذیل واضح شود	1	2	3	4	99	98

OTHER: و غیره: _____

Q20. Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government (wollsiwoli) is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? [MORE THAN ONE OPTION POSSIBLE; ASK AND MARK INSTITUTIONS ONLY]

اگر به گمان شما فیصله ولسوالي درست نباشد به کي ها در ذیل ترجیح می‌دهید که مراجعه نمایید (امکان دارد که از يك زياد انتخاب کنید)

a)	Village shura شوري قريه	1	h)	Police پوليس	8
b)	District shura شورى ولسوالي	2	i)	Court محكمه	9
c)	Governor / Provincial administration والي/اداره ولايت	3	k)	Nobody كس هيچ	10
d)	Security commander قوماندان امنيه	4	l)	Other [SPECIFY BELOW] وغيره واضح شود	11
e)	Tribal authority مسولين قومي	5	m)	Don't know نميدانيم	99
f)	Influential patron قدرتمندان	6	n)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98
g)	Mullah / Spiritual authority ملا	7			

OTHER وغيره : _____

Q21. Parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied?

شاملين منازعه وسيله هاي مختلف را به كار ميبرد تا منازعه را دلخواه خود فيصله كند. شما چه فكر ميكنيد كه وسيله هاي ذيل چقدر بكار برده ميشود

		Never هيچ وقت	Rarely كم وقت	Some- times بعضي وقت	Always هميشه	Don't know نميدانيم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Connections / kin ties / quam روابط / خویشاوندی / قومیت	1	2	3	4	99	98
b)	Money پول	1	2	3	4	99	98
c)	Force قوه	1	2	3	4	99	98
n)	Other [SPECIFY BELOW] وغيره در ذیل واضح شود	1	2	3	4	99	98

OTHER: وغيره _____

Q22. Has the state (district and provincial-level) been involved in conflict in or between communities in 2006)? If so, what impact did it have?

ايا در سال 2006 حكومت ولسوالي و ولايتی در منازعات كه بين قريه جات واقع شده بود دخيل بودند؟ اگر بلي چه تاثير داشت

State was not involved ولسوالي شامل نبود	0
State made things worse ولسوالي كار را خراب كرد	1
State had no impact ولسوالي تاثير نداشت	2
State improved things/ resolved conflict ولسوالي كار را جور كرد منازعه فيصله شد	3
Not applicable منازعه موجود نبود	97
Don't know نميدانيم	99
Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Power قدرت

Villages can have different ways in organizing the daily life of the community. We will now ask some questions on who is taking decisions in the village and how decisions are taken.

قریه جات راهای مختلف دارد که امورات روزمره خود را تنظیم کند. ما بعضی سوالات را میپرسیم که در قریه کی تصمیم میگیرد و چه قسم تصمیم گرفته میشود

Q23. Whom do you consider the most powerful person in your village?

به فکر شما در قریه شما کی زیادت قدرتمند هستند (یک نفر را انتخاب کنید)

a)	A mullah / imam / said ملا/امام/سید	1	h)	The head of shura ریس شور	8
b)	A trader تجار	2	i)	A police officer افسر پولیس	9
c)	A landlord / khan خان/زمیندار کلان	3	k)	Elders (tribal, village) کلان قوم و قریه	10
d)	A teacher معلم	4	l)	Other [SPECIFY BELOW] و غیره واضح شود	11
e)	A doctor داکتر	5	m)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
f)	A kommandon قوماندان	6	n)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98
g)	The malik / arbob ملک/ارباب	7			

OTHER: و غیره _____

Q24. Why do you think this person is powerful?(multiple choice)

چرا فکر میکنید که این شخص قدرتمند است (چند انتخاب کرده میتوانید)

		Fully disagree کاملاً موافق نستم	Rather dis- agree کم موافق نیستم	Rather agree کم موافق هستم	Fully agree کاملاً موافق هستم
a)	Because of his wealth به خاطر پول ان	1	2	3	4
b)	Because of his guns به خاطر سلاح ان	1	2	3	4
c)	Because he has a position in the state administration به خاطر موقف دولتی ان	1	2	3	4
d)	Because he has a position with a NGO به خاطر موقف ان در موسسه	1	2	3	4
e)	Because he is respected as a spiritual leader به خاطر که رهبر روحانی است احترام ان میشود	1	2	3	4
f)	Because he is respected as a communi- ty leader به خاطر یک کلان قریه میباشد احترام ان میشود	1	2	3	4
g)	Other (please specify) و غیره واضح شود				
h)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99			
i)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98			

Q25. In your opinion, is this person more important or less important for solving significant problems of your community than the wolliswol?

به نظر شما در مورد حل مشکلات عمده مردم شما آیا این شخص نظر به ولسوال زیاد مهم است و یا کم مهم است

Much less important بسیار کم مهم است	1
Less important کم مهم است	2

Neither / nor	نه کم است نه زیات	3
More important	زیاد مهم	4
Much more important	بسیار زیاد مهم	5
Don't know	نمیدانیم	99
Refused to answer	جواب نداد	98

شوری Shura

Some villages in Afghanistan deal with important issues in form of shuras. Shuras may meet regularly or only when important issues arise. Shuras may represent the village to the outside or only deal with issues inside the community. We will now ask a few questions on how shuras work in your community.

[In case there is no shura at all please continue with Q33]

بعضی قریه جات افغانستان در مورد مسایل مهم با شوری ها سرو کار دارند. این شوری ها امکان دارد منظم ملاقات کند و یا تنها در مورد مسایل مهم با هم میبیند. شوری امکان دارد از قریه نمایندگی کند و یا تنها در داخل قریه با موضوعات مهم سرو کار دارند. ما چند سوال راجع به شوری میپرسیم که چه قسم شوری در جامعه کار میکند (اگر در قریه شوری موجود نباشد به سوال 33 بروید)

Q26. Do you or a member of your household regularly participate in the shura?

ایا شما و یا اعضا خانواده شما به طور منظم در شوری اشتراك مینکنید

Yes بلی	No نی	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
1	0	99	98

Q27. I will read you a statement. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with this statement.

برای شما یک جمله میخوانیم. بگویید که به چه اندازه به آن موافق و یا مخالف هستید

		Disagree غیر موافق	Agree موافق	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	In our community usually only some households attend the shura to discuss matters of concerns در جامعه ما معمولاً بعضی خانواده ها در شوری اشتراك میکند و در مورد موضوعات بحث میکند	1	2	99	98

If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choices possible)

اگر تنها بعضی خانواده ها در شوری اشتراك میکند، اینها معمولاً خانواده های میباشند که..... (چند انتخاب کرده میتوانید)

		Yes بلی	نی
a)	...are landrich and wealthy ثروتمند و زمیندار هستند	1	0
b)	...are elected انتخاب شده	1	0
c)	...are invited / appointed by a powerful person توسط قدرتمندان دعوت و یا تعیین شده	1	0

	... belong to a specific ethnic group or groups مربوط نژاد مشخص هستند	1	0
	... belong to a specific tribe قوم مشخص هستند	1	0
	... belong to a specific clan مربوط قبیله مشخص هستند	1	0
d)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99	
e)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98	

Q28. I will read two statements to you. Please indicate to which you agree more! [MARK STATEMENT TO WHICH RESPONDENT SAYS TO AGREE MORE]

دو جملات برای شما میخوانیم به کدام يك ان زیادتر موافق هستید. (به هر جمله که زیادتر موافق بود انرا نشانی کنید)

a)	Usually, the decisions taken by the shura are in the best interest of the entire community. معمولا شوري که تصمیم میگیرد به نفع تمام جامعه میباشد	1
b)	Usually, decisions taken by the shura are in the best interest of a few influential households only. معمولا شوري که تصمیم میگیرد تنها به نفع خانواده هاي قدرتمند و پر نفوذ میباشد	2
c)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
d)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q29. Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community?

شوري هاي که تصمیم میگیرد برای قریه شما مهم میباشد. آیا شما فکر میکنید که این تصمیم بالاي قدرتمندان که خارج از قریه شما باشد تاثیر دارد؟

		Never نه	Sel- dom کم	Some- times بعض وقت	Fre- quently مکرر	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	An external landlord/Arbab/Khan زمیندار کلان بیروني/خان/ارباب	1	2	3	4	99	98
b)	Kommandan قوماندان	1	2	3	4	99	98
c)	A member of an international or- ganization عضو اداره بين المللي	1	2	3	4	99	98
d)	A member of district / provincial government عضو حكومتي (ولسوالي/ولایت)	1	2	3	4	99	98
e)	Others (please specify) و غیره واضح شود	1	2	3	4	99	98
f)	not applicable قابل اجرا نیست	97					

IF NEVER → Q31. اگر نی به سوال 31 بروید

Q30. If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above.

اگر بلي: به فکر شما متنفذين خارج قریه تصمیم گیري را خوب میدانند و یا بد، نشانی کنید

		Influence is rather good تأثير نسبتا خوب	Influence is rather bad تأثير نسبتا بد	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	An external landlord / khan زمیندار کلان بیرونی/خان	0	1	99	98
b)	Kommandon قوماندان	0	1	99	98
c)	A member of an international organization عضو اداره بین المللی	0	1	99	98
d)	A member of district / provincial government عضو حکومتی (ولسوالی/ولایت)	0	1	99	98
e)	Others و غیره واضح شود	0	1	99	98

Q31. Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects?

ایا شورې در تعیین و تطبیق پروژه های انکشافی سهیم میباشد

Yes بلی	No نی	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
1	0	99	98

Q32. In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because...

به نظر شما چرا بعضی پروژه ها انکشافی انتخاب میشود و دیگر نی؟ به خاطریکه

		Yes بلی	No نی
a)	...the majority of the households voted for it? اکثریت مردم برای ان رای داده انده	1	0
b)	...some powerful households wanted it? بعضی خانواده قدرتمند انرا میخواست	1	0
c)	...the NGO / IO wanted it? موسسه انرا میخواست	1	0
d)	Other (please specify) () و غیره واضح شود	1	
e)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99	
f)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98	

Local organizational capacities / Social capital ظرفیت ادارات محلی/توانایی اجتماعی

اجتماعی

Solidarity and collective action

همبستگی و فعالیت جمعی

Some issues in your village are dealt with by households individually; other issues may require the cooperation with other households within or even beyond the community. We will now ask questions about a number of situations that may require cooperation.

بعضی موضوعات در قریه شما انفرادی میباشد ولی بعضی موضوعات به تشریک مساعی ضرورت دارد. ما حالا راجع به حالت میپرسیم که به تشریک مساعی ضرورت دارد

Q33. If a crop disease were to affect the entire standing crop of this community, then who do you think would come forward to deal with this situation?

اگر تمام نباتات منطقه شما توسط مرض متاثر شود، شما چه فکر میکنید که کی در این حالت اقدام میکند

a)	Every household would deal with this problem individually هر خانواده انفرادي اقدام میکند	1
b)	Neighborhoods همسایه در بین خود همراي ان معامله میکند	2
c)	Palwan Shareek (field neighbors) پلوان شریکان	
d)	The entire village تمام قریه	3
e)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
f)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q34. If your household does not have enough people in the household to harvest your crops, will other members of your village help you to fill this gap?

اگر خانواده شما افراد کافي براي جمع اوري حاصلات نداشته باشد ايا ديگر مردم قریه با شما کمک میکنند.

a)	Yes I would find help in the village بلي مردم قریه با ما کمک میکنند	1	if yes answer Q35; otherwise go to Q36 در صورت بلي به سوال 36 ودر غير آن به سوال 36 مراجعه کنید
b)	I would hire wage labour within the village مامز دور را از قریه استخدام میکنیم	2	
b)	I would neither find help nor wage labour in the village در قریه ما کمک یا مامز دور هیچ یک بدست آورده نمیتوانم.	0	
c)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99	
d)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98	

Q35. What do you have to give in return for assistance? چه میدهید تا کمک به دست اورید(از یک زیاد میتواند)

a)	Nothing هیچ چیز	1
b)	Money پول	2
c)	Food غذا	3
d)	Return the favour by helping them out, when they need assistance به آنها کمک میکنیم وقتیکه ضرورت پیدا کند	4
e)	Other (please specify) و غيره واضح شود	5
f)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
g)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q36. Does everybody in your village carry out their hashar responsibilities equally (or similar collective obligations)?

ايا هر فرد قریه شما کار هاي حشر ويا نوع متبادل حشر را مساويانه انجام میدهند؟

a)	Most people are not interested and do not help. زياد مردم علاقمندي ندارد و کمک نه میکند	2
b)	Some people help a bit. بعضي مردم يك ذره کمک میکند	3
c)	Most people help. زياد مردم کمک میکند	4

d)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
e)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q37. If somebody in the community wanted to send a member of the family aboard and needed money, who do you think would be most likely to help – given that they had the money?

اگر کس بخواهند عضو فامیل خود را به خارج روان کند و به پول ضرورت داشته باشد. چه فکر میکنید که کس انرا کمک خواهند کرد

		Unlikely احتمال ندارد	Likely احتمال دارد
a)	The extended family فامیل که از همان خانواده جدا شده باشد	1	2
b)	The family and some neighbors اعضا فامیل و بعضی همسایه	1	2
c)	The family and almost everyone in the village فامیل و تقریباً تمام مردم قریه	1	2
d)	Other, please specify و غیره مشخص سازید	1	2
e)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99	
f)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98	

Communal Norms معیار های اشتراکی

In your village there are rules of what members of the community are obliged to do. Sometimes members might non-the-less deviate from commonly accepted norms. We will now ask a few questions about situations like this.

در جامعه شما بعضی قوانین وجود دارد که هر کس باید جبرا انرا قبول کند. بعضی وقت بعضی افراد از ان انحراف میکنند. میخواهم در این مورد بپرسیم

Q38. I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you agree with each of them.

چهار جمله به شما میخوانم نشان بدهید که به چه اندازه با ان موافق هستید

		Fully disagree کاملاً مخالف	Rather disagree نسبتاً مخالف	Rather agree نسبتاً موافق	Fully agree کاملاً موافق	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Each member of a community should devote his/her free time and money to common projects and events of his/her community. هر فرد جامعه (مرد و زن) باید وقت فارغ و پول خود را به پروژه و واقعه مشترک جامعه بدهند	1	2	3	4	99	98
b)	It's up to a person to decide how to spend his time and money. این مربوط به شخص میباشد که چه قسم پول و وقت خود را مصرف کند	1	2	3	4	99	98

c)	If a family is doing something that contradicts common norms of behavior of my community such behavior should be corrected اگر يك فاميل يك كار كه مخالف قوانين جامعه مي باشد انجام مي دهد مردم جامعه اين حرکت انها را بايد اصلاح كند	1	2	3	4	99	98
d)	If a family is doing something that contradicts common norms of behavior of my community they shouldn't stay in our community. اگر يك فاميل يك كار كه مخالف قوانين جامعه مي باشد انجام مي دهند انها در جامعه بود باش كرده نه ميتوانند	1	2	3	4	99	98

Q39. If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody repeatedly no body participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option)

اگر شما و يا اعضا فاميل شما به يك كار حشر دعوت شويد و هيچ كس از فاميل شما مكرراً در ان اشتراك نه كند در حاليكه هر كس مي دانند كه بعضي از فاميل شما اين كار را انجام داده ميتوانست در نتيجه براي فاميل شما چه چيز امكان دارد كه واقع شود (چند حالت را انتخاب كرده ميتوانيد)

		Likely احتمال دارد	Possible امكان دارد	Impossible امكان ندارد
a)	People would censure us مردم ما را سرزنش خواهند كرد	1	2	3
b)	People would exclude us from the events in my village my community در اين صورت مردم ما را از قريه خارج كند	1	2	3
c)	A local official would refuse to help us مسولين محلي ما را كمك نخواهند كرد	1	2	3
d)	People would spread slanders about us مردم ما را تهمت وارد خواهند كرد	1	2	3
e)	People would avoid talking to us مردم گپ زدن به ما بند خواهند كرد	1	2	3
f)	No consequences كدام حرکت عليه ما نخواهند كند	1	2	3
g)	Don't know نميدانم	99		
h)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98		

شبکه و تحرک Networking & Mobility

A lot of day-to-day life takes place within the household. Members of households do, however, also communicate with other people from other households with and beyond the village. We are interested with whom you communicate frequently beyond the confines of your household.

اعضا يك خانواده در زندگي روزمره با هم بر ميخورد و همچنان به ديگر خانواده ها چه در داخل قريه و چه در خارج از قريه نيز روابط دارد ما ميخواهيم بدانيم كه روابط خانواده شما توسط كي در بيرون قريه برقرار ميشود

Q40. Where and how frequently do you meet with people (not your kin group) *in the territory* of your village? در قريه شما چه قسم و در كجا با مردم ملاقات ميكنيد(به استثنای دوستهای خویش) ؟

		Never هيچ وقت	Seldom كم	Sometimes بعضي وقت	Frequently مكرراً
a)	In the street در كوچه	1	2	3	4
b)	At a private house در خانه شخصي	1	2	3	4
c)	At a sports event / recreation در ميدان ورزش/ورزش	1	2	3	4
d)	At an event organized by an NGO جاي كه توسط موسسه تنظيم شده باشد	1	2	3	4
e)	In the market در ماركيٲ	1	2	3	4
f)	Gathering place for livestock در محل گرد اوري حيوانات	1	2	3	4
g)	Village spring در چشمه قريه	1	2	3	4
h)	Religious Ceremony در مراسم مذهبي	1	2	3	4
j)	Meeting place of the Shura محل شورې	1	2	3	4
j)	Mosque مسجد	1	2	3	4
k)	Other (SPECIFY BELOW) و غيره در ذيل واضح شود	1	2	3	4

OTHER: و غيره _____

Q41. Where and how frequently do you meet with people (not your kingroup) *outside your village*? در خارج قريه شماچه قسم و در كجا با مردم ملاقات ميكني(به استثنای دوستهای شما) ؟

		Never هيچ وقت	Seldom كم	Sometimes بعضي وقت	Frequently مكرراً
a)	In the street در كوچه	1	2	3	4
b)	At a private house در خانه شخصي	1	2	3	4
c)	At a restaurant/tea-house در هوتل / چاي خانه	1	2	3	4
d)	At a sports event / recreation/ ورزش در ميدان ورزش/ورزش	1	2	3	4
e)	At an event organized by an NGO جاي كه توسط موسسه تنظيم شده باشد	1	2	3	4
f)	In the market در ماركيٲ	1	2	3	4
g)	Gathering place for livestock در محل گرد اوري حيوانات	1	2	3	4
h)	Village spring در چشمه قريه	1	2	3	4
i)	Religious Ceremony در مراسم مذهبي	1	2	3	4
j)	Shura شورې	1	2	3	4
k)	Mosque مسجد	1	2	3	4
l)	Other (SPECIFY BELOW) و غيره در ذيل واضح شود	1	2	3	4

OTHER: و غيره _____

Q42. How often do you leave outside your village?

چند مرتبه شما خارج از قریه میروید

a)	Each day هر روز	1
b)	Not each day, but at least once a week کم از کم در هفته يك بار	2
c)	Not each week, but at least once a month کم از کم در ماه يك بار	3
d)	Less than once a month کمتر از يك دفعه در يك ماه	4
e)	Never هيچ وقت	5
f)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
g)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

اعتماد Trust

Q43. If you left the village for a longer period, do you believe that the household would be safe from other people in the village?

اگر شما برای وقت زیاد قریه را ترك می کنید، آیا شما گمان می کنید که خانواده شما از دیگر مردم در امان می باشد؟

Very unsafe هیچ محفوظ نیست	Rather unsafe نسبتاً محفوظ نیست	Rather safe نسبتاً محفوظ است	Very safe بسیار محفوظ است	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
1	2	3	4	99	98

خدمات دولتی و قانونیت State services and legitimacy

Afghanistan experienced a long period of instability and conflict. Over the past five years a new Afghan state is re-emerging with the support of the International Community. We will now ask questions about what this process means for your household.

افغانستان تجربه بی ثباتی و جنگ های دراز دارد. در 5 سال گذشته دولت جدید افغانستان به کمک جامعه بین المللی به میان آمد. شما بگوئید که این مرحله برای خانواده شما چه ارزش دارد.

Q44. I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community.

چهار جمله برای شما می خوانیم بگوئید که چه اندازه با آن مخالف و یا موافق هستید (جملات ذیل مربوط قریه می باشد)

	increase the quality of drinking water. اب اشامید نی صحتی زیاد شود	increase the quality of agricultural production کیفیت تولیدات زراعتی بهبتر شود	to increase the quality of roads وضعیت سرکها بهبتر شود	create more jobs برای مردم کار پیدا شود	increase the access to electricity مردم به برق دسترسی پیدا کند	increase the quality of schooling کیفیت تدریس بهبتر شود
a)	In the last two years international organizations have helped to: در دو سال گذشته ادارات بین المللی کمک کردند تا:					

b)	In the last two years, the government has helped to: در دو سال گذشته حکومت کمک کرد تا:						
c)	In the last two years, an influential person has helped to: در دو سال گذشته شخص قدرتمند کمک کردند تا:						
d)	In the last two years, we have done a lot ourselves in our community to: در دو سال گذشته خود ما کار زیاد کردیم تا:						

1. **Fully disagree** کاملاً مخالف
2. **Rather disagree** نسبتاً مخالف
3. **Rather agree** نسبتاً موافق
4. **Fully agree** کاملاً موافق
5. **Don't know** نمیدانیم
6. **Refused to answer** جواب نداد

Q45. Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from?

اعضا، خانواده شما کدام يك از منابع ذیل را برای آب بشكل منظم استعمال میکنند

		بلي Yes	ني No
a)	Stagnant open water sources (ponds, puddles) اب استاده مانند حوض	1	0
b)	Open channel sources (كاريز، جوي، چشمه) منابع سرباز متحرك	1	0
c)	Rivers دریا	1	0
d)	Uncovered wells چاه سرباز	1	0
e)	Covered wells چاه سربسته	1	0
f)	Piped water schemes اب نل	1	0
g)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99	
h)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98	

Q46. Does your household receive electricity from one of the following sources?

ایا خانواده شما یکی از منابع ذیل برق به دست آورده است

		بلي Yes	ني No
a)	Does your household receive electricity? آیا خانواده شما برق دارد؟	1	0
b)	Individual household generator از جنریتور خانواده دیگر	1	0
c)	Generator shared between a number of households از جنریتور مشترك خانواده ها	1	0
d)	Micro-hydro scheme از شبکه كوچك ابي	1	0
e)	Public electricity (landline) از برق عمومي	1	0
f)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99	
g)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98	

Q47. Over the last year, how many boys and girls from your household attended a public school regularly?

از خانواده شما در سال گذشته چه تعداد دختران و پسران به طور منظم به مکتب میرفت

Girls تعداد دختران : _____

Boys تعداد پسران : _____

IF NO CHILDREN ATTENDED SCHOOL REGULARILY → Q49. اگر نی به سوال 49 بروید

Q48. Over the last year, how would you rate the quality of schooling? Please indicate which of the following statements resembles your opinion best.

سال گذشته کیفیت تدریس را چه قسم ارزیابی میکنید؟ در ذیل ان جمله را نشانی کنید که با نظر شما شباهت دارد

a)	I don't approve of what the children are taught at school. می شود قبول ندارم	1
b)	The standard of teaching was very bad and the children learned nothing. معیار تدریس بسیار خراب است اطفال هیچ چیز را نه اموخته اند	2
c)	The standard of teaching was poor and the children only learned a little. معیار تدریس خراب است اطفال چیز کمی را اموخته اند	3
d)	The standard of teaching was medium and the children learned a moderate amount. معیار تدریس متوسط است اطفال چیز محدود را اموخته اند	4
e)	The standard of teaching was good and the children learned a lot. معیار تدریس خوب است اطفال چیز زیاد را اموخته اند	5
f)	The standard of teaching was excellent and the children learned a huge amount. معیار تدریس عالی است اطفال مقدار زیاد را اموخته اند	6
g)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
h)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q49. We don't have children at school because: _____

اطفال ما به بخا

طری به مکتب نمیروند که:

a. We have no children of school age.

اطفال مطابق سن مکتب نداریم

b. The children are busy on the farm.

اطفال ما در

زمین کار میکند

c. The school is far away

مکتب از قریه ما دور میباشد

d. I don't approve of what the children are taught at school.

میشود قبول ندارم

Q50. A police force is being built up in Afghanistan. What is, in your opinion, the impact of the police for the security in your community? Please indicate which of the following three statements resembles your impression best!

در افغانستان قوه پولیس ایجاد گردیده است. به نظر شما در تامین امنیت جامعه شما چه اثر دارد؟ در سه جمله ذیل هر جمله که به عقیده شما شباهت خوب دارد انرا نشانی کنید

a)	The police has a negative impact on the security of our community. پولیس در امنیت جامعه ما اثر منفی دارد	1
b)	The police has no impact on the security of our community. پولیس در امنیت جامعه ما اثر ندارد	2
c)	The police has a positive impact on the security of our community. پولیس در امنیت جامعه ما اثر مثبت دارد	3
d)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
e)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q51. Suppose your household needs a salam credit of about Afs. 15000 How difficult it is for you to get this credit
فرض کنید که خانواده شما برای مصارف زراعت به 15000 افغانی قرض ضرورت دارد؟ چقدر مشکل است که این قرض را به دست آورید؟

Very difficult بسیار مشکل است	Rather difficult نسبتاً مشکل است	Rather easy نسبتاً آسان است	Very easy بسیار آسان است	No land cultivated زمین را کشت نکرده	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
1	2	3	4	97	99	98

Q52. Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! [INTERVIEWER: CODE WITH 1 FOR "FIRST" TO 3 FOR "THIRD"!]

به گمان غالب شما قرض را از کجی به دست خواهید آورد؟ سه شخص را مشخص کنید که برای قرض گرفتن به آنها میروید (به شخص اولی 1 به شخص دومی 2 و به شخص سومی 3 نوشته شود)

a)	Nobody هیچ کس	
b)	A relative اقارب	
c)	A neighbor (not a relative) همسایه	
d)	A friend (not a neighbor or relative) رفیق	
e)	A rich member of your community (not a neighbor or relative) شخص دولتمند از قریه شما	
f)	Malik / Arbob (not a neighbor or relative) ملك و ارباب	
h)	An Afghan state bank بانك دولتي	
i)	A credit scheme from an international Organization or NGO پروگرام قرضه موسسات	
j)	Other [SPECIFY BELOW] و غیره واضح شود	
k)	Don't know نمیدانیم	99
l)	Refused to answer جواب نداد	98

Q53. In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes?
در سال گذشته کدام يك از مالیات ذیل را تادیه کرده اید؟

		Yes بلي	No ني	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	Zakaat ذکات	1	0	99	98
b)	Ushr عشر	1	0	99	98

c)	state taxes	مالیات دولتی	1	0	99	98
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If yes, to whom did you pay: 1. Zakat ذکات _____ 2. Usher عشر _____

3. State taxes مالیات دولت _____

- a. poor person of your kin group مردم غریب از دوستان شما
b. poor person of your community مردم غریب از قریه شما
c. religious organization سازمان های مذهبی
d. district government ولسوالی
e. commander و غیره _____ f. other قوماندان

Q54. Do you think the wolliswoli or provincial government take care of the needs of your villages population? شما فکر میکنید که ولسوالی یا حکومت ولایتی متوجه ضروریات مردم قریه شما است؟

Never نی	Rarely بسیار کم	Sometimes بعض وقت	Frequently زیاد	Always همیشه	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
1	2	3	4	5	99	98

قوانین و ارزش ها Norms and Values

Q55. I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them.

برای شما شش جمله میخوانم، نشانی کنید و در چه بدهید که موافق یا مخالف هستید

	Fully disagree کاملا مخالف	Rather disagree نسبتاً مخالف	Rather agree نسبتاً موافق	Fully agree کاملاً موافق	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
Education of boys in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for boys in our community. تعلیم بچه ها در جامعه ما اثر مثبت دارد. به این اساس دولت باید امکانات تدریس بچه ها را بهبود بخشند	1	2	3	4	99	98
Education of girls in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for girls in our community. تعلیم دختران در جامعه ما اثر مثبت دارد. به این اساس دولت باید امکانات تدریس دختران را بهبود بخشند	1	2	3	4	99	98
Wage labour is becoming more and more important for the financial well-being of households. It would be good for the community if off-farm job opportunities would increase for both men and women. برای اقتصاد خانواده کار روز مزد بسیار مهم است. پس برای جامعه بهتر است که برای زن و مرد خارج از مزرعه کار پیدا شود	1	2	3	4	99	98
State-schooling is complementary to local customs and Islamic values. I think it has a	1	2	3	4	99	98

positive impact on the moral constitution of the community. نصاب تدریسی دولت متمم ارزش های اسلامی میبا شدویه فکر ما تاثیر مثبت در جامعه ما دارد.						
I feel that foreign development aid is threatening our local way of life and Islamic values in our community, although it may bring material benefits. ما احساس میکنیم که کمکهای خارجی برای انکشاف زندگی عادی و ارزشهای اسلامی ما را تهدید میکند، گر چه منفعت مادی به دست می آید	1	2	3	4	99	98
The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community. عساکر خارجی رسوم محلی و ارزشهای اسلامی جامعه ما را تهدید میکند	1	2	3	4	99	98

NGO / IO Perception : **موسسات** : In the past years a range of organizations worked in Afghanistan with the decollated intention to enable economic development, relieve poverty and enhance stability. We will now ask a number of questions on the impact development organizations may have had for your household and your community.

در سالهای گذشته سازمانهای متعدد در مورد انکشاف اقتصاد، از بین بردن فقر و استقرار ثبات کار میکنند. ما میپرسیم که بالایی خانواده و جامعه شما چه اثر وارد کرده اند

Q56. Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years?

ایا در دو سال گذشته خانواده شما از همکاریهای انکشافی مستفید شده اند؟

		Yes بلی	No نی	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	We received food aid. مواد غذایی به دست آوردیم.	1	0	99	98
b)	We received training or advice. ترنینگ گرفتیم	1	0	99	98
c)	We received salary or rent (e.g. for renting out offices). معاش و یا کرایه به دست آوردیم.	1	0	99	98
d)	We received credit. قرض به دست آوردیم.	1	0	99	98
e)	We received other services دیگر خدمات را به دست آوردیم	1	0	99	98

Q57. Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years?

ایا تمام مردم قریه شما از همکاری انکشافی مستفید شده اند

		Yes بلی	No نی	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	The community received food aid. تمام مردم مواد غذایی به دست آورده	1	0	99	98
b)	The community has profited from training, advice, and / or capacity building. مردم از ترنینگ فایده گرفته است	1	0	99	98
c)	Schooling in the community was improved. تدریس بهبود یافته است	1	0	99	98

d)	Electricity supplies of the community have been improved. رسیدن برق به مردم بهبود یافته است	1	0	99	98
e)	Jobs for persons from the community have been created. به مردم کار پیدا شده اند	1	0	99	98
f)	Extension services have been provided to farmers of your community. مهیا گردیده اند برای دهاقین قریه خدمات ترویجی مهیا گردیده اند	1	0	99	98
g)	Roads and Bridges important to the community were built. سرکها و پل های عمده اعمار شده اند	1	0	99	98
h)	The quality of the community's drinking water has been improved. اب اشامیدنی صحی برای مردم مهیا شده اند	1	0	99	98
i)	Irrigation for community fields has been increased. اب آبیاری برای زمینهای مردم تهیه شده	1	0	99	98

امار و ارقام Demography

Finally, we would like to ask a number of demographic questions about you and your household. The information cannot be used to relate the information back to you or your household and is for statistic purposes only.

در اخیر چند سوال راجع به شما و خانواده شما میپرسیم، که این ارقام تنها برای اهداف احصاییوی بکار برده میشود

D1. Respondent: Personal characteristics : خصوصیات شخصی جوابدهنده:

Age عمر	Gender جنس		Head of household سرپرست خانواده		Are you nomad (ku-chi)? آیا شما کوچی هستید؟	
	Male مذکر	Female مؤنث	Yes بلی	No نی	Yes بلی	No نی

d1) What is your ethnic belonging? _____ گروه نژادی شما

- 1) Pashtoon پشتون
- 2) Tajek = تاجک
- 3) Hazara = هزاره
- 4) Uzbak = ازبک
- 5) Turkman = ترکمن
- 6) Arab عرب
- 99 = Don't know نمیدانیم
- 98 = Refused to answer جواب نداد

e) What is your tribal belonging? _____ قوم شما چه است
98 = جواب نداد Refused to answer = 99 = Don't know نمیدانیم

f) Which party do you fell affiliated to? _____ به کدام تنظیم مربوط هستید

- 1) Jamiaat Islami جمعیت اسلامی
- 2) Shura Nizar = شورې نظار
- 3) Ittihad Islami اتحاد اسلامی
- 4) Junbish Mili Islami جنبش (دوستم)
- 5) Hizb Islami حزب اسلامی (حکمتیار)

- 6) Other (Specify) _____
 8) None هیچ يك
 99) Don't know
 98) Refused to answer جواب نداد

D2. Respondent: Education and Profession **تعليم و مسلک جوابدهنده**

a) Can you read and write? _____ خواندن و نوشتن کرده ميتوانيد
 Literate باسواد = 0 Illiterate بي سواد = 1 Refused to answer جواب نداد = 98

b) Years spent in public school _____ سالهاي که در مکتب سپري نموده ايد

- c) What is your job? _____ وظيفه شما چه است
- 1= Farmer دهقان
 - 2= Craftsman صنعت کار
 - 3= Intelligentsia (teacher, pharmacist, medical doctor معلم، داکتر و غيره روشنفکر
 - 4= Administration مامور اداري
 - 5= NGO Job کارمند موسسه
 - 6= other service providers other کسبه کار
 - 7= Police and military پوليس و عسکر
 - 8= other _____ و غيره واضح شود=
 - 9= None هیچ
 - 99= Don't know نميدانيم
 - 98 = Refused to answer جواب نداد =

d) Which of the following describes your household best? _____ در ذيل کدام يك خانواده شمارا
 تشریح کرده ميتواند

- 1= Landless بي زمین
- 2= Landowner زميندار
- 3= Cultivator کشت کننده
- 4= Landlord زميندار کلان
- 99= Don't know نميدانيم
- 98 = Refused to answer جواب نداد =

D3. Respondent: Religion **مذهب جواب دهنده**

a) What is your religious confession? _____ مذهب شما چه است

- 1= Sunni سني
- 2= Shia شيعه
- 3= Ismaili اسمعيليه
- 4= Other (specify) _____ و غيره واضح شود
- 99= Don't know نميدانيم
- 98= refused to answer جواب نداد =

b) Religious schooling ? _____ تدریس مذهبي

- 1= none هیچ
- 2= local محلي
- 3= national ملي
- 4= abroad در خارج
- 99= Don't know نميدانيم

98= refused to answer جواب نداد

D4. Household خانواده

		Number تعداد	Don't know نمیدانیم	Refused to answer جواب نداد
a)	How many members live in your household? تعداد اعضاء خانواده شما		99	98
b)	How many nuclear families live in your household? تعداد فامیل در خانواده شما		99	98
c)	How many boys of schooling age live in your household? تعداد بچه ها يکه سن ان مطابق سن مکتب باشد		99	98
d)	How many girls of schooling age live in your household? تعداد دختران که سن ان مطابق سن مکتب باشد		99	98
e)	How many members of your household belong to an organized armed group or security force? تعداد افراد خانواده شما که مربوط گروپهاي مسلح و يا قوه امنيتي ميباشند		99	98

Surveyor comment/observations

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